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A PERCEPTION-BASED TEST FOR EVALUATING GOVERNMENT
DISPLAYS OF THE TEN COMMANDMENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
From the moment Moses bore them down from the fiery pinnacle of
Mt. Sinai, the Ten Commandments' played an omnipresent role in the
development of law: first in the ancient Hebraic tradition and later in the
modern Western one as well. 2 Since the beginning of the American na-
1. See Exodus 19:18-20:18 (King James) (laying out Ten Commandments).
The full text of the Commandments found at Exodus 20:1-17 reads:
And God spake all these words, saying, I am the LoRD thy God, which
have brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of
bondage.
Thou shalt have no other gods before me.
Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any
thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that
is in the water under the earth. Thou shalt not bow down thyself to
them, nor serve them: for I the LoD thy God am a jealous God,
visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third
and fourth generation of them that hate me; And shewing mercy
unto thousands of them that love me, and keep my commandments.
Thou shalt not take the name of the LoRD thy God in vain; for the LoRD
will not hold him guiltless that taketh his name in vain.
Remember the sabbath day, to keep it holy. Six days shalt thou labour,
and do all thy work: But the seventh day is the sabbath of the LoRD
thy God: in it thou shalt not do any work, thou, nor thy son, nor thy
daughter, thy manservant, nor thy maidservant, nor thy cattle, nor
thy stranger that is within thy gates: For in six days the LoRD made
heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is, and rested the
seventh day: wherefore the LoRD blessed the sabbath day, and hal-
lowed it.
Honour thy father and thy mother: that thy days may be long upon the
land which the LoRD thy God giveth thee.
Thou shalt not kill.
Thou shalt not commit adultery.
Thou shalt not steal.
Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour.
Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's house, thou shalt not covet thy
neighbour's wife, nor his manservant, nor his maidservant, nor his
ox, nor his ass, nor any thing that is thy neighbour's.
Id.; see also Deuteronomy 5:8-21 (stating alternative version of Commandments).
2. See Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2861 (2005) (plurality opinion)
(acknowledging that "[t]here is an unbroken history of official acknowledg-
ment . ..of the role of religion in American life from at least 1789" (quoting
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674 (1984))); Susanna Dokupil, "Thou Shalt Not
Bear False Witness ": "Sham" Secular Purposes in Ten Commandments Displays, 28 HARv.
J.L. PUB. POL'Y 609, 615 & nn.30-31 (listing authorities, including U.S. presidents,
(379)
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tion, the stone-etched ideals of the Commandments have influenced the
legal structures that govern both the religious and the nonreligious alike. 3
Paying homage to this heritage, over two hundred displays bearing the
Commandments currently stand on public land throughout the United
States.
4
Yet as much as the Ten Commandments specifically-and religion
generally-have molded Western civilization, so too have values of relig-
ious freedom driven the emergence of the modern legal conscience. 5 The
value of religious freedom has enabled the growth of religious diversity. 6
Yet with this growth has risen a concern about the propriety of govern-
ment-sponsored displays of the Commandments, particularly in a nation
that have acknowledged importance of Decalogue to Western law). See generally
FRANK LAMBERT, THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN AMERICA
(2003) (tracing religious influences on American society from Reformation
through Puritan communities to early nineteenth century).
3. See LAMBERT, supra note 2, at 1 (summarizing commitment of New England
Puritans to society founded on faith in God). Lambert notes that the Puritans of
the Massachusetts Bay Colony drafted a constitution rooted in faith in the "All-
mighty God." See id. (noting that Puritans believed that "the word of God requires
that to mayntayne the peace and vnion of such a people there should be an or-
derly and decent Government established according to God"). Their neighbors in
Connecticut drafted a similar document that created a "Christian Common-
wealth" to be a "City upon a Hill." See id. (discussing what colony founders per-
ceived as divine purpose of their settlement). Yet Lambert also notes that
America's religious past extends as far back as the Reformation and the age of
faith-and conflict-that emerged from it. See id. at 45 (describing how Reforma-
tion influenced religious groups that would later play central role in development
of American heritage).
4. See Robert Preer, Ten Commandments Get an Indiana Niche, BOSTON GLOBE,
July 31, 2005, at A6 (stating that Fraternal Order of Eagles donated many of over
two hundred monuments to local governments). Interestingly, many displays were
inspired by the 1956 movie The Ten Commandments. See id. (noting origin of
displays).
5. See Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 214 (1963) (suggesting that history
of religious persecution against forebears of American founders has deeply influ-
enced development of modern society).
6. See Marci A. Hamilton, The Establishment Clause During the 2004 Term: Big
Cases, Little Movement, 2005 CATO Sup. CT. REv. 159, 176 (describing religious diver-
sity in America since Founding). Even at the time of the Founding, Hamilton
states, religious diversity was far from non-existent in America, with deists, Roman
Catholics, Jews and numerous Protestant sects all well-represented by 1789. See id.
(listing various religious groups present in America at Founding). Religious diver-
sity did not necessarily equate to religious tolerance, however. See id. at 176-77
(noting that although many of religious groups present at time of Founding had
come to America because they were oppressed in Europe, they did not govern
their new settlements under attitude of religious tolerance). As the importance of
both diversity and toleratce grew throughout American history, the Court has be-
come more concerned with the religious protections secured by the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment. See id. at 177-78 (noting that rise in religious toler-
ance equated to rise in importance of Establishment Clause).
[Vol. 51: p. 379
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where anyone may freely worship or not worship, evangelize or not evan-
gelize, believe in God or disbelieve. 7
It was amidst these concerns that in June 2005 the Supreme Court
issued opinions in Van Orden v. Perry8 and McCreary County v. ACLU;9 two
cases challenging public displays of the Ten Commandments. 10 The de-
cades prior to these decisions witnessed a series of First Amendment Estab-
lishment Clause cases advancing both abstract theories and practical
approaches for determining the constitutionality of Ten Commandments
displays and other religiously influenced government actions.1 ' Despite
arguable facial inconsistency, Van Orden and McCreary suggest a continua-
tion of the trend toward contextual analysis as the primary consideration
in Establishment Clause cases. 12 Together, these decisions suggest a two-
part context-based test that focuses on the perceived religious message
that the Commandments display communicates rather than an abstract
examination of the government purpose behind it.13
This Note discusses Establishment Clause precedent as it applies to
Ten Commandments cases and suggests a two-part context-based test to
define the framework within which to evaluate Commandments displays. 14
7. SeeJay Tolson, Divided, We Stand, U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REP., Aug. 8, 2005, at
42 (observing that as of 2000, it is estimated twenty-nine million Americans es-
poused no religion, up from only fourteen million in 1990).
8. 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005) (plurality opinion).
9. 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005).
10. See generally McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2745 (requiring removal of Command-
ments displayed on wall of courthouse); Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2864 (allowing
Commandments monument to remain on grounds of state capitol complex).
11. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (announcing three-
prong Establishment Clause test that considers government purpose, effect of chal-
lenged act and entanglement with religious organization when determining consti-
tutionality of display); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973) (characterizing
criteria of test announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman as "no more than helpful sign-
posts" in Establishment Clause analysis); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688, 690
(1981) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (proffering endorsement test, which evaluates
whether reasonable observer would perceive improper government endorsement
of religion in display); Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 594 (1984) (adopting
endorsement test when considering Establishment Clause issues); Zelman v. Sim-
mons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652-53 (2002) (holding that no Establishment Clause
violation exists if individuals have private choice to avoid exposure to religious
content).
12. See Ian Heath Gershengorn, Lingering Uncertainty, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 3, 2005,
at 8 (observing that, although Ten Commandments cases are "highly contextual,"
there is little conflict among lower courts in applying context-based tests, as indi-
cated by Supreme Court's affirmance of different courts of appeals in Van Orden
and McCreary). But see Martha McCarthy, The Ten Commandments on Trial, 194
EDUC. L. REP. 473, 484 (2005) (suggesting that Supreme Court would have had to
strike Texas monument as well as Kentucky courthouse displays in order to remain
consistent with precedent).
13. For a discussion of the context-based test and arguments in favor of adopt-
ing it, see infra notes 151-82 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the evolution of Establishment Clause decisions, see
infra notes 19-110 and accompanying text. For an explanation of the context-
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Part II of the Note summarizes the Establishment Clause precedent over
the past forty years. 15 Part III describes the facts of Van Orden and Mc-
Creary and presents the Court's rationale in each case. 16 Part IV proposes
a two-part context-based test for examining the constitutionality of Ten
Commandments displays. 17 Part V examines the benefits of the context-
based test and describes how it allows one to interpret Van Orden and Mc-
Creary as an extension of the Court's context-based approach to Establish-
ment Clause issues.'
8
II. WHEN LIFE GiVES You LEMONS: THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE TEST IN
LEMON v. KURTZMAN AND THE COURT'S DIFFICULTY IN
CONSISTENTLY APPLYING IT
A. The Lemon Test
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment states: "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion."19 In 1971, the
based test proposed by this note and its interaction with current precedent, see
infra notes 151-67 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of Establishment Clause precedent, see infra notes 19-110
and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of Van Orden and McCreay, see infra notes 111-50 and
accompanying text.
17. For a description of the proposed context-based test, see infra notes 151-
67 and accompanying test.
18. For analysis of the context-based test and its application to future Estab-
lishment Clause cases, see infra notes 168-82 and accompanying text.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the
Establishment Clause requires the government to remain neutral toward religion.
See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839
(1995) (acknowledging importance of neutrality in religion cases). Rosenberger
held that a university's distribution of funds to a religious student organization for
publication of a religious newsletter would be neutral toward religion because the
university also provided similar funding to all student groups regardless of relig-
ious status. See id. at 824-26 (describing university's funding policy toward student
groups). Thus any benefit conferred upon religion was merely incidental to the
neutral allocation of funds. See id. at 843-44 (allowing governmental funding of
practice that conferred only incidental benefit on religion); cf. Kiryas Joel v.
Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 690 (1994) (acknowledging role of neutrality in Establish-
ment Clause analysis); Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 243 (1963) (Brennan,
J., concurring) (same); Everson v. Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (same).
This principle of neutrality essentially requires the government neither to in-
hibit nor to endorse a religious or irreligious creed. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393
U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (describing practical implication of principle of neutrality).
Epperson further stated: "The First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality
between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion." Id.; cf. Wal-
lace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 53 (1985) (stating "the First Amendment embraces the
right to select any religious faith or none at all"). But see id. at 83 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (questioning ability of government to ever be fully neutral as well as
desirability of obtaining full neutrality even if possible); Inke Muehlhoff, Freedom of
Religion in Public Schools in Germany and in the United States, 28 GA. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 405, 407 (2000) (noting in essay on comparative religion law among several
European nations and United States that, while religion-neutral government mini-
[Vol. 51: p. 379
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Supreme Court decided the seminal Establishment Clause case of Lemon v.
Kurtzman.20 Lemon was the Court's first significant attempt to create an
elemental test for determining a violation of this Clause.2 '
mizes conflict centered around religious sectarianism, such strict neutrality is diffi-
cult to create or maintain). Muehlhoff notes that the traditional American notion
of strict separation of church and state is not synonymous with strict government
neutrality toward religion, under which the "government would be forbidden to
utilize religion as a standard for action or inaction because the religious clauses
prohibit classification in terms of religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a
burden." Id. at 412. (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 14-2, at 1155 n.1 (2d ed. 1988)). Strict neutrality that could be inferred from the
Establishment Clause has never been instituted in the American governmertal sys-
tem because the Free Exercise Clause guarantees that the government will not
restrict the practice of religion. See id. (explaining incompatibility of strict neutral-
ity with American judicial system).
For a discussion of the interplay between the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses, see United States v. Means, 858 F.2d 404, 407-08 (8th Cir. 1988) (outlining
summary of Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence); RodneyJ. Blackman, Showing the
Fly the Way Out of the Fly-Bottle: Making Sense of the First Amendment Religion Clauses, 42
U. KAN. L. REv. 285, 304-07 (1994) (articulating arguments that attempt to recon-
cile conflicting ideals of Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses and acknowledg-
ing challenges in doing so); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An
Update and Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 685, 686-90 (1992) (describ-
ing benefits of religious accommodation, theory that Religion Clauses require re-
moval of impediments to religious expression without inducing religious
observance); Thomas F. Lamacchia, Note, Reverse Accommodation of Religion, 81
GEO. L.J. 117, 127-28 (1992) (discussing interplay between Religion Clauses).
Yet beyond paying nominal homage to the principle of neutrality, the Court
generally does not conduct an extensive analysis based upon it. See Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 618 (1971) (acknowledging importance of neutrality but
conducting Establishment Clause analysis based upon newly announced three-
prong test). But see, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 634, 653 (2002)
(granting much weight to considerations of neutrality in Establishment Clause
analysis); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 114 (2001) (same);
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839 (same). Lemon acknowledged that a challenged fund-
ing scheme that funneled government monies to private religious schools for relig-
ion-neutral use could not be administered with true neutrality. See Lemon, 403 U.S.
at 606-08, 618 (explaining why challenged statutes ran afoul of Constitution). Yet
the Court reached this holding not by undertaking an analysis of pure neutrality,
but by announcing a test premised upon, inter alia, the government intent behind
the statute and the effects of it. See id. at 612-13 (using standards from previous
cases to create three-criterion Establishment Clause test). Thus, instead of adopt-
ing a pure neutrality based approach to Establishment Clause cases, Supreme
Court precedent has instead developed a number of tests for adjudicating the con-
stitutionality of a government act. See infra notes 19-110 and accompanying text
(describing various Establishment Clause tests).
20. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
21. See Dan Mbulu, First Amendment: Extending Equal Access to Elementay Educa-
tion in the Aftermath of Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 16 REGENT U. L.
REv. 91, 102 (2004) (noting that Lemon was first time Court articulated now-tradi-
tional three-part test used in Establishment Clause cases); Anne E. Stockman,
Comment, ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Regional Board of Education: The Black Sheep
of Graduation Prayer Cases, 83 MINN. L. REv. 1805, 1812 (1999) (same). The Court
had, of course, considered establishment issues before. See, e.g., Engle v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421, 436 (1962) (invalidating state law mandating that prayer be held in
public schools); McGowan v. Maryland., 366 U.S. 420, 452-53 (1961) (upholding
5
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1. The Facts of Lemon v. Kurtzman
In Lemon the Court consolidated two cases involving challenges to ed-
ucation funding statutes. 2 2 Two state legislatures enacted laws allowing
the state government to essentially compensate private schools for their
educational services. 23 Religious schools were included among those insti-
tutions that received state funding from the program. 24 The two statutes
spurred an Establishment Clause challenge despite provisions in both stat-
utes that prevented public funds from supporting any expressly religious
component of a private school's curriculum.
25
law requiring closure of retail stores on Sunday because purpose of law was to
encourage day of rest and rejuvenation); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312
(1952) (upholding constitutionality of statute authorizing public school students
to be released from class for purposes of religious instruction); Everson v. Ewing,
330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (upholding resolution of local school board to provide pub-
licly funded busing of schoolchildren to parochial schools). Yet Lemon nonetheless
represents the Court's first attempt to create a unified test for application of the
Establishment Clause. See Stockman, supra at 1812-13 (declaring that Lemon repre-
sented first comprehensive test for Establishment Clause issues).
22. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606-08 (describing Pennsylvania and Rhode Island
statutes that allowed public funds to be directed to both religious and nonreligious
private schools).
23. See id. (outlining structure of challenged statutory programs). The state
legislatures had chosen to provide funding because private schools relieved strain
on the public education system by decreasing enrollment at public schools. See id.
(noting purpose of statutes was to compensate private schools for benefit rendered
to public education system).
24. See id. at 607-10 (noting that both religious and nonreligious institutions
benefited from states' programs). Because many private schools in Rhode Island
and Pennsylvania substantially eased the strain on the states' public education sys-
tems, the two states devised payment systems by which private schools, including
religious ones, received state aid for their services. See id. at 607, 609. The Rhode
Island statute permitted the state to supplement the salaries of teachers at private
institutions that met a per-pupil expenditure criterion by up to fifteen percent of
the teachers' salary. See id. at 607. The supplemental income was paid directly to
the teachers; the schools themselves were never parties to the transaction. See id.
In order to receive the salary supplement, the state required a teacher to refrain
from teaching any course in religion for the duration that the teacher received the
salary benefit. See id. at 608 (acknowledging that Rhode Island had attempted to
prevent public funds from supporting religious activities).
Pennsylvania enacted a statute for similar purposes but instead made pay-
ments directly to the schools. See id. at 609. The schools could then use the funds
for expenses such as teachers' salaries, textbooks and instructional materials. See
id. Reimbursement was available only for certain courses traditionally taught in
the public schools, such as mathematics, modern foreign language, sciences and
physical education. See id. at 610. All materials purchased with state money re-
quired the approval of the state Superintendent of Public Education. See id. Like
the Rhode Island statute, the Pennsylvania statute prohibited the schools from us-
ing state monies to fund any course containing "subject matter expressing relig-
ious teaching or the morals or forms of worship of any sect." Id. Both statutes
included auditing provisions requiring the schools to submit accountability reports
to the state. See id. at 620-21 (describing accountability structures imposed by
statutes).
25. See id. at 610-11. (noting that teachers of courses with religious content
were barred from both programs). Taxpayers challenged both statutes on Estab-
[Vol. 51: p. 379
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol51/iss2/4
2. Formulating a Test for Establishment Clause Violations: The Supreme
Court's Lemon Opinion
The Court devised a three-part test composed from standards used to
decide previous Establishment Clause cases. 26 To comply with the Estab-
lishment Clause, a government action: (1) must have a secular legislative
purpose, (2) must have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion and (3) may not create "'an excessive government entanglement
with religion.'"27
Purpose, the first criterion of the Lemon test, examines the govern-
mental intent underlying the enactment of a certain statute or the under-
taking of a certain action. 28 Purpose includes the "avowed" intent stated
by the government as well as the contextual appearance of intent deter-
mined by the circumstances surrounding the government's action. 29 A
nominal governmental statement of secular purpose will not satisfy the
criterion if circumstances indicate some other religious intent behind the
display.30 The purpose analysis is largely objective in nature, determined
from the government's perspective of its intent in undertaking an ac-
tion. 3' In Lemon, the Court found no improper purpose underlying the
states' enactment of the funding schemes. 3
2
The effect criterion of the test requires that the challenged govern-
ment act have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits relig-
ion.3 3 This does not mean that the government action may have no
lishment Clause grounds, arguing that the laws violated First Amendment princi-
ples of church-state separation. See id.
26. See id. at 612-13 (describing cases upon which Court predicated Lemon).
The primary sources of the Lemon test are Board of Education of Central School District
v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) and Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). See
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (noting precedent for Lemon ruling). For an explanation
of how these cases relate to the Lemon test, see infra notes 31, 33, 37 and 39.
27. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 674).
28. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980) (per curiam) (describing
purpose analysis under Lemon test).
29. See id. at 41 (holding that stated secular purpose is not sufficient to justify
display of Ten Commandments where government act itself belies religious pur-
pose). In Stone, Kentucky required display of the Ten Commandments in public
school classrooms for the stated purpose of representing the Commandments' in-
fluence on the Western legal tradition. See id. at 39 n.1 (laying out challenged
statutory provisions). Nevertheless, the Court identified the Commandments as an
inherently religious text; therefore, the very display of them acted as a call to chil-
dren and teachers to read and accept their religious dictates. See id. at 42 (holding
that mere display of Commandments had religious effect).
30. See id. at 41 (1980) (holding that "an avowed secular purpose is not suffi-
cient to avoid conflict with the First Amendment") (internal quotations omitted).
31. See Allen, 392 U.S. at 243 ("[T]o withstand the strictures of the Establish-
ment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion.").
32. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613 (noting that in Lemon there was "no basis for a
conclusion that the legislative intent was to advance religion").
33. See Allen, 392 U.S. at 243 (explaining requirements of purpose and effect
analysis, which Court included in Lemon test).
2006] NOTE
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religious effect whatsoever; it simply means that the primary effect must be
secular. 34 Incidental secondary benefits bestowed on religion will not give
rise to an Establishment Clause violation.3 5 In Lemon, the Court declined
to reach the issue of whether the challenged statutes had the improper
primary effect of aiding religion, instead focusing its analysis on the final
criterion of its newly announced Lemon test.3 6
This final criterion requires that the government action create no ex-
cessive entanglement between governmental and religious institutions.3 7
Under Lemon, government entanglement occurs in primarily two ways.3 8
First, entanglement may result from continuous and oppressive govern-
ment monitoring of religious organizations.3 9 The Court held that the
34. Cf Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 843
(1995) (analogizing that government act may have effect of benefiting religious
group so long as beneficial effect is not primary effect of statute).
35. See Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 64 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring) ("We
have not interpreted the [purpose] prong of Lemon. . . as requiring that a statute
has exclusively secular objectives.") (internal quotation and citation omitted); cf.
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 843 (suggesting that if public university were to provide
general access to printers and copiers and religious organizations utilized that ser-
vice, no constitutional violation would occur because benefit received by religious
organizations is incidental to legitimate secular purpose of providing means for
expression of ideas).
36. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613 (declining to conduct effects analysis and in-
stead focusing inquiry in Lemon on impermissible government entanglement with
religion).
37. See id. at 613 (announcing entanglement prong of Lemon test); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (stating that to meet guarantees of Establish-
ment Clause, government action may not constitute "excessive government entan-
glement" with religion); cf Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 684 (1984) (stating
that only certain forms of entanglement are unconstitutional). Lynch stated that
"[e]ntanglement is a question of kind and degree." Id. In order to rise to the level
of unconstitutional entanglement under the Establishment Clause, the interaction
between government and religious organizations must rise to the level of pervasive
oversight or meddling. See id. Government interaction permitted under the first
two criteria of the Lemon test will not become impermissible under the final crite-
rion simply because the action creates public controversy; administrative intermin-
gling between governmental and religious organizations must exist in order for
the government act to run afoul of this element of the test. See id. (noting that
more than public discord is necessary for finding of unconstitutional
entanglement).
38. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 620 (observing that rigorous and continual state
inspection that would be necessary to administer funding programs would uncon-
stitutionally entangle government oversight with activities of religious organiza-
tions); see also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997) (noting that
"[i] nteraction between church and state is inevitable .... and we have always toler-
ated some level of involvement between the two"); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S.
783, 798-99 (1983) (Brennan,J., dissenting) (stating that only overbearing govern-
ment monitoring of religious organizations satisfies entanglement element of
Lemon test).
39. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614-15 (describing entanglement); see also Walz, 397
U.S. at 674-75 (holding that in case challenging tax exemption granted to religious
institutions, either upholding tax exemption or subjecting churches to govern-
ment taxation involved some degree of entanglement, but that only administrative
[Vol. 51: p. 379
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statutes in Lemon violated this entanglement criterion by creating an unac-
ceptable paradox. 40 Under the statutory schemes, the states could not
provide funding to religious entities without also requiring oversight be-
cause such a lack of accountability would run the risk that the institutions
would spend public funds on religious activities. 4 1 Yet neither could the
states create an oversight system because doing so would excessively med-
dle in the affairs of religious organizations.
42
The second way that government may violate the entanglement crite-
rion of the Lemon test is by performing an action that creates the potential
for political divisiveness. 4 3 Though the Court did not elaborate upon this
form of political entanglement, its later decisions explain that unconstitu-
tional divisiveness surpasses mere public difference of opinion over how
the government acts.4 4 The divisive entanglement required is institutional
in nature.4 5 Unconstitutional divisive entanglement requires excessive in-
teraction between government and the administration of a religious or-
ganization causing intricate intertwining of the two institutions.4 6 Public
oversight necessary to tax churches rose to level of impermissible entanglement
barred by First Amendment).
40. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619-21 (explaining how statutes violated Establish-
ment Clause via government entanglement).
41. See id. at 620-21 (" [T] he very restrictions and surveillance necessary to en-
sure that teachers play a strictly non-ideological role give rise to entanglements
between church and state.").
42. See id. at 627 (Douglas, J., concurring) (acknowledging that unsupervised
grants run unconstitutional risk of government monies being used for religious
instruction and that supervision necessary to police such grants creates unconstitu-
tional risk of excessive entanglement between religion and government).
43. See id. at 622 (suggesting that potential for political divisiveness is imper-
missible under entanglement prong of Lemon test). In determining whether en-
tanglement has occurred, the Court noted that factors such as the "character and
purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the [gov-
ernment] provides, and the resulting relationship between the government and
the religious authority" are key to the entanglement analysis. See id. at 615. Fur-
ther, the Court held that programs that could be construed as government-sanc-
tioned funding of religion have the potential to create political sectarianism, an
evil that the First Amendment sought to avoid. See id. at 622 (describing objectives
of First Amendment). The Court noted: "[P]olitical division along religious lines
was one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended to
protect." Id.
44. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233-34 (1997) (suggesting that politi-
cal divisiveness must derive from institutional entanglement in order to render
government act unconstitutional); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (questioning whether political divisiveness without
component of institutional entanglement is impermissible under Lemon test).
45. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 233-34 (holding that "[u]nder our current under-
standing of the Establishment Clause, the [potential to create political divisiveness
is] insufficient by [itself] to create an excessive entanglement") (internal quotation
omitted).
46. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 689 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he constitu-
tional inquiry should focus ultimately on the character of the government activity
that might cause such divisiveness, not on the divisiveness itself. The entangle-
ment prong of the Lemon test is properly limited to institutional entanglement.").
9
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controversy alone is not sufficient to declare an act of government uncon-
stitutional under Lemon.
4 7
3. Application of the Lemon Test
Theoretically, a statute or government action must meet all three of
the Lemon criteria to avoid violating the Establishment Clause. 48 In reality,
however, the Court has sometimes applied the complete test, sometimes
applied only the purpose criterion and sometimes used various combina-
tions of the Lemon criteria in examining Establishment Clause cases. 49 In
the years since Lemon, the Court has applied the test in several significant
In recent years the Court has altered the Lemon test slightly by acknowledging that
entanglement and effect are really two blades of the same sword. See Agostini, 521
U.S. at 233 (observing that Establishment Clause inquiry is simplified by folding
entanglement criterion into effect criterion of Lemon test). Since Agostini, many
lower courts that have applied the Lemon test have considered entanglement an
indication that the effect of a particular government act may be primarily religious
and therefore unconstitutional. See, e.g., Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland,
370 F.3d 1252, 1284-85 (11th Cir. 2004) (analyzing entanglement as subcom-
ponent of effect issue); Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 301 F.3d 401, 415 (6th Cir. 2002)
(same); Freedom from Religion Found. v. Bugher, 249 F.3d 606, 611 (7th Cir.
2001) (same); DeStefano v. Emergency Hous. Group, 247 F.3d 397, 406, 413-14
(2d Cir. 2001) (noting that Agostini fused entanglement and effects prongs of
Lemon test and remanding case for further determination of whether public funds
were used improperly to support religiously influenced Alcoholics Anonymous
program); Keonick v. Felton, 190 F.3d 259, 265 n.6 (4th Cir. 1999) ("Agostini also
suggests that in some contexts the entanglement inquiry be considered an aspect
of the second 'effect' prong."); ACLU ex rel. Lander v. Schundler, 168 F.3d 92, 97-
98 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating that injunction preventing Christmas display based solely
on political divisiveness was improper in light of Agostinf's merged effects/entan-
glement analysis); Stark v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 123 F.3d 1068, 1073 (8th Cir. 1997)
(conducting Lemon analysis under merged effect/entanglement question).
47. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 689 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (proffering
rule that excessive entanglement must be institutional-not merely popular-in
nature before Establishment violation arises). In Lynch, Justice O'Connor distin-
guished between popular and institutional entanglement. See id. (describing vari-
ous kinds of entanglement). While popular controversy over a decision may
contribute to the determination of whether a government act is constitutional,
such controversy alone will not render such a holding. See id. (noting that political
controversy alone cannot create constitutional violation).
48. Cf Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 390-408 (1983) (upholding Minnesota
statute allowing parents to deduct educational expenses related to their children's
attendance at religious schools after noting that challenged statute had met all
three elements of Lemon); Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 1068-69 (9th
Cir. 2002) (conducting complete three-part Lemon analysis).
49. See Dokupil, supra note 2, at 623 (noting Establishment Clause cases over
past twenty years have tended toward effect-only analysis); Paul Earl Pongrace, III,
Justice Kennedy and the Establishment Clause: The Supreme Court Tries the Coercion Test, 6
U. FtA. J.L. & PUB. Pou'Y 217, 217 & n.2 (1994) (noting that Lemon test has been
inconsistently applied and providing examples of illogical results thereof).
As Dokupil notes, the Court has consistently drifted away from the purpose-
based analysis of government intent toward an effect-only analysis and more re-
cently toward conducting the analysis of the reasonable observer. See Dokupil,
supra note 2, at 622-23 (observing that Court's focus on effects test in Lynch and
Allegheny calls into question continuing validity of Lemon). For a discussion of the
10
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cases.5 0 Yet as often as the Court has applied the test, it has expressed
equal ambivalence with the test's helpfulness on other occasions. 5' In
fact, the Court has sometimes forgone a Lemon analysis altogether.
52
importance of the reasonable observer in more recent Establishment Clause cases,
see infra notes 53-110 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56-60 (1985) (holding that statute
requiring moment of silence at beginning of public school day violated purpose
criterion of Lemon because legislature acted with intent to encourage prayer and
religious meditation); Mueller, 463 U.S. at 390-408 (upholding tax deduction for
educational expenses related to children's attendance at religious schools); Stone
v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42-43 (1980) (per curiam) (holding that Lemon required
removal of Ten Commandments displays from public school classrooms).
Stone was the most recent Supreme Court decision addressing Ten Command-
ments issues prior to Van Orden and McCreary. The case, in which the Court sum-
marily reversed the court of appeals without granting oral argument or allowing
the parties to brief the merits of the case, concerned a Kentucky statute requiring
the display of the Ten Commandments in public school classrooms. See Stone, 449
U.S at 39 n.1 (supplying text of challenged statute). The statute required the post-
ing of privately funded displays whenever the state received sufficient voluntary
contributions to purchase them. See id. (noting that displays were technically pri-
vately funded). The Court held that the Commandments "do not confine them-
selves to arguably secular matters" and that posting them on classroom walls could
serve only to induce meditation on their religious message. See id. at 41-42 (hold-
ing that Commandments were inherently sacred in nature). The displays there-
fore violated the purpose element of the Lemon test, and the Court mandated that
they be removed. See id. at 42-43.
51. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 319-20 (2000) (Rehn-
quist, C.J., dissenting) (observing that Lemon has had "checkered career" in subse-
quent Establishment Clause cases); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free
Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398-99 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (expressing frustra-
tion that Court continues to apply Lemon despite precedent indicating that Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence has become controlled by other tests); Hunt v.
McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973) (describing Lemon elements as "no more than
helpful signposts" in Establishment Clause analysis). In Lamb's Chapel, Justice
Scalia colorfully explained his distress over Lemon:
Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its
grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried,
Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again, fright-
ening the little children and school attorneys of Center Moriches Union
Free School District .... Over the years . . . no fewer than five of the
[then] currently sitting Justices have, in their own opinions, personally
driven pencils through the creature's heart (the author of today's opin-
ion repeatedly), and a sixth has joined an opinion doing so.
Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 398 (Scalia, J., concurring).
52. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002) (employing
neutrality analysis to find constitutional program that compensated parents in fail-
ing school districts for tuition paid to send children to religious or other private
institution); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 114-15 (2001)
(engaging in neutrality analysis to hold that denial of after-school access to class-
rooms to Christian instruction program for children was unconstitutional because
district program permitting private organizations to use school facilities main-
tained neutrality toward religion); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790-93 (1983)
(forgoing Lemon analysis and relying on historical justification for upholding state
salary paid to Presbyterian chaplain who opened each legislative day with prayer);
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 252 (1982) (refusing to apply Lemon because stat-
ute at issue favored specific denomination and explaining that Lemon applied only
2006] NOTE
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B. The Endorsement Test: Justice O'Connor Revises the Lemon Approach
Against a spotty application of the Lemon doctrine, Justice O'Connor's
concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly53 first proposed an alternative Establish-
ment Clause analysis that would later become a significant rival to
Lemon.54 In Lynch, the city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, sponsored a
creche, which was seasonally erected in a privately owned park in the city's
downtown district.55 Other secular holiday decor, such as Christmas trees,
candy canes and reindeer, appeared alongside the crche.
56
After recognizing that no bright lines exist in the area of Establish-
ment Clause law, the majority stated that Lemon attempts to impose some
broad boundaries in the midst of this ambiguity. 57 Yet the majority ap-
plied only the purpose and entanglement criteria of the Lemon test, leav-
ing effect issues unaddressed. 58 In further breaking with Lemon, the
majority evaluated the context of the display, determining that it commu-
nicated no message of government endorsement of a religious creed and
was therefore acceptable. 59
1. The Advent of the Endorsement Test: Justice O'Connor's Concurrence in
Lynch v. Donnelly
In her Lynch concurrence, Justice O'Connor expressed discontent
with Lemon, noting that it had been difficult both to apply the abstract
to acts that provided uniform benefit to all religions); cf McCarthy, supra note 12,
at 484 (noting that majority of Supreme Court justices at time of publication of
article had questioned continued applicability of Lemon test).
53. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
54. See id. at 687-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (laying out factors of endorse-
ment test).
55. See id. at 671 (describing challenged display). The city had owned the
nativity display for over forty years and had annually sponsored it. See id. The
nativity featured traditional figures, including the infant Christ, Mary, Joseph,
shepherds, Magi, angels and stable animals. See id. The figures ranged in height
from five inches to five feet. See id. The city incurred costs of about twenty dollars
per year setting up and removing the display and the nominal cost of lighting it at
night. See id.
56. See id. (noting contents of display). The court described the extent of the
challenged display in the following way:
The Pawtucket display comprises many of the figures and decorations tra-
ditionally associated with Christmas, including, among other things, a
Santa Claus house, reindeer pulling Santa's sleigh, candy-striped poles, a
Christmas tree, carolers, cutout figures representing such characters as a
clown, an elephant, and a teddy bear, hundreds of colored lights, a large
banner that reads "SEASONS GREETINGS," and the creche at issue here.
Id.
57. See id. at 678-79 ("In each [Establishment Clause] case, the inquiry calls
for line-drawing; no fixed, per se rule can be framed.").
58. See id. at 681-84 (discussing at length purpose and entanglement issues
implicated by display but leaving effects unaddressed).
59. See id. at 680 (determining that evidence was insufficient to warrant con-
clusion of improper governmental purpose).
390 [Vol. 51: p. 379
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criteria of the test and to explain the relationship between the purpose/
effect/entanglement analysis and the values of religious freedom in the
First Amendment.60 Though Justice O'Connor proposed a revision of the
Lemon test, she first made several observations about the nature of govern-
ment acts barred by the Establishment Clause. 6' These observations
would later provide a base for the development of the endorsement test.
62
Establishing the foundation for later endorsement test jurisprudence,
Justice O'Connor stated that improper government establishment of relig-
ion can take two primary forms. 63 First, the establishment may constitute
an excessive government entanglement with religion, which may compro-
mise the independence both of the interfering government organization
and of the religious institution subject to meddling.64 Second, govern-
ment may more directly interfere with religion by actively communicating
an endorsement or disapproval of a religious or irreligious creed-the
foundational premise of the endorsement test.
65
The endorsement test is measured by the standard of a reasonable
observer.66 According to Justice O'Connor, "[e]ndorsement sends a mes-
60. See id. at 688-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that logical relation-
ship (if one exists) between Lemon test and First Amendment values has been diffi-
cult for Court to explain).
61. See id. at 688 (discussing nature of Establishment Clause challenges to gov-
ernment action). For a description of Justice O'Connor's observations, see infra
note 66.
62. See Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 594-600 (1989) (adopting endorse-
ment test in plurality section of Court's opinion and reasonable observer inquiry in
section of opinion joined by majority).
63. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating manner in
which impermissible government establishment with religion can occur).
64. See id. (describing impermissible government interaction with religion).
65. See id. (discussing impermissible government endorsement of religion).
66. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 620 (stating that "constitutionality of [a display's]
effect must ... be judged according to the standard of a 'reasonable observer'")
(internal quotations omitted); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(suggesting that establishment inquiry should be conducted based on message gov-
ernment act sends to observers). Although most of Justice O'Connor's opinion
proposed revisions to the Lemon test, consideration of the nonadherent's perception
represents a significant shift in the approach to Establishment Clause issues. See
Steven A. Seidman, County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union: Embrac-
ing the Endorsement Test, 9 J.L. & RELIGION 211, 226 (1991) (declaring that Lynch
shifted focus away from awkward Lemon test and toward endorsement test, which
could be more consistently and uniformly applied). Previously, the Court had
overwhelmingly applied either the Lemon test or a neutrality analysis, both of which
focus largely on governmental intent or an objective analysis of whether the gov-
ernment's action benefits or deters religion-essentially an effect analysis. See
supra note 19 (discussing principle of neutrality and its effect on Establishment
Clause jurisprudence); see also Seidman, supra at 217-19 (describing history of Es-
tablishment Clause cases decided before Lemon).
In support of this shift in perception, Justice O'Connor cited Abington v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963). See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., con-
curring) (citing Schempp as precedent for principles undergirding endorsement
test). In Schempp, two states required mandatory Bible readings at the beginning of
each school day. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 205 (describing provisions of statutes
13
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sage to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the po-
litical community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they
are insiders, favored members of the political community. Disapproval
sends the opposite message." 67 Unlike the Lemon test, which focuses on
the government's purpose in acting and the effects thereof, the endorse-
ment test shifts the focus to the perspective of those witnessing the govern-
ment espousal of religion.
68
Justice O'Connor's Lynch concurrence did not actually suggest that
the endorsement test replace Lemon as the primary mode of Establishment
analysis, though some commentators have observed that this is in practice
what has happened. 69 Instead, Justice O'Connor essentially used this en-
dorsement commentary as a prologue to a proposed revision of the Lemon
test.70 Yet her suggested Lemon revisions had a relatively minor effect on
requiring Bible reading). The statutes faced an Establishment Clause challenge.
See id. The Court held that statutory provisions allowing students to leave the room
during the scripture readings could not mitigate the governmental establishment
of religion that took place during those readings. See id. at 224-25 (holding opt-out
provision provided no defense to unconstitutional statutory scheme). In deciding
the case, the Court conducted a traditional analysis: though Lemon had not yet
been issued, the Schempp Court announced its decisions by relying on a neutrality/
purpose/effect inquiry. See id. at 222 (stating analytical framework for finding of
unconstitutionality). The Court would later announce the latter two principles as
formal components of the Lemon test. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-
13 (1971).
Yet Schempp, while not direct precedent for the endorsement test, nonetheless
indicates that even before Justice O'Connor's Lynch concurrence, the Court ex-
pressed sensitivity to individuals who might feel like outsiders because of govern-
ment intermeddling with religion. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 224-25 (holding that
statutes mandating Bible reading were "in direct violation" of plaintiffs' rights).
67. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (laying foundation for
inquiry that would later become known as endorsement test).
68. Cf Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595-97 (using perception of reasonable observer
rather than government purpose to evaluate nativity display).
69. See Randall P. Bezanson, The Quality of First Amendment Speech, 20 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 275, 290 n.60 (1998) (observing that Lemon has been replaced
by endorsement test); Jesse H. Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its Status and Desirabil-
ity, 18 J.L. & POL. 499, 499, 508 (2002) (suggesting that, in practice, Court has
abandoned Lemon test as "defunct" and that endorsement is becoming preferred
inquiry).
70. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 n.* (O'Connor, J., concurring) (admitting that
Justice O'Connor intended to revise Lemon test by writing concurrence in Lynch).
Justice O'Connor's discontent with the Lemon test sprung from the inability of over
a decade of case law to describe how the purpose/effect/entanglement inquiry
relates to and safeguards the values of religious freedom enshrined in the Estab-
lishment Clause. See id. at 688-89 (explaining why Lemon required revision).
Justice O'Connor's clarified version of Lemon sought to remedy this logical
disconnect by altering the Lemon analysis in several ways. See id. at 689 (summariz-
ing proposed reform to Lemon test). First, impermissible entanglement must be
limited only to institutional entanglement between the administrations of govern-
ment and religion. See id. at 689. Mere potential for political divisiveness is not
sufficient to constitute entanglement unless accompanied by excessive institutional
interaction between government and religion. See id. Second, purpose must focus
on whether the government intends to "convey a message of endorsement or dis-
(Vol. 51: p. 379
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the Court's analysis of Establishment Clause cases.7 1 Her commentary on
the endorsement of religion, however, spawned an entirely new mode of
analysis that has become an often-applied test in establishment cases.
72
2. Endorsement Endorsed: Allegheny v. ACLU and the Rise of the Reasonable
Observer
The official adoption of the endorsement test came in 1989 with the
issuance of the Court's opinion in Allegheny v. ACLU.73 Allegheny involved
challenges to two Christmas holiday displays on government-owned prop-
erty.74 The first display was a privately owned nativity erected by Allegheny
County, Pennsylvania, in the foyer of the Grand Staircase in its county
courthouse. 75 The display stood alone and functioned as a staging area
approval of religion." Id. at 691. This involves both objective analysis of the gov-
ernment's stated purpose as well as subjective analysis of the circumstances
surrounding the challenged government act. See id. at 690. Finally, the crucial
effect inquiry is whether the government practice has the effect of communicatinga
message of endorsement or disapproval of religion, which is different than the
message itself having a religious effect. See id. at 691-92 (refining effect test to state
that effect of display that does not communicate endorsement is not relevant to
Lemon inquiry). An effect that incidentally renders a benefit to a religious group
would be acceptable underJustice O'Connor's revised Lemon test provided that the
message itself does not communicate approval or disapproval of religion. Accord
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 843-44 (1995)
(suggesting that benefit conferred on religion incidental to otherwise proper gov-
ernment act is not unconstitutional).
71. See generally Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 594-600 (1989) (adopting
justice O'Connor's formulation of endorsement test rather than her proposed re-
visions to Lemon test). Since the advent of the endorsement test, the federal courts
of appeals have embraced it, applying the test in a variety of cases. See, e.g., Buono
v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 548 (9th Cir. 2004) (acknowledging relevance of endorse-
ment test); Freethought Soc'y of Greater Phila. v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247,
259 (3d Cir. 2003) (same); ACLU v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438, 446 (6th Cir.
2003) (same), afftd, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005); Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282,
1297 (lth Cir. 2003) (same); Ind. Civil Liberties Union v. O'Bannon, 259 F.3d
766, 770 (7th Cir. 2001) (same).
72. See Choper, supra note 69, at 505-08 (describing evolution of endorsement
test into major analytical approach in Establishment Clause cases).
73. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
74. See id. at 578 (noting that displays had been erected in courthouse in Alle-
gheny County, Pennsylvania, and outside building shared by Allegheny County
and City of Pittsburgh).
75. See id. at 579 (describing location of display). The display was owned and
maintained by the Holy Name Society, a Roman Catholic religious organization.
See id. (noting that county did not officially own display). A sign accompanied the
display indicating its ownership. See id. at 580. Though the county did not own the
creche, the county provided red and white poinsettias, an evergreen tree and a
fence to cordon the display from public access. See id. (stating that county had
made several additions to church-owned parts of display). No figures or icons rep-
resenting the secular dimensions of the Christmas holiday were present. See id. at
580-81 (commenting on non-secular nature of display). Together, the nativity,
plants, and fence occupied a substantial amount of room around the Grand Stair-
case. See id. (observing that creche commanded attention of all who walked past
Great Staircase).
15
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for the county's lunchtime Christmas carol program, which invited various
musical groups to perform during the holiday season. 76 Residents, aided
by the ACLU, challenged the constitutionality of the creche displayed on
publicly owned property.
77
The second display challenged in Allegheny sat on property jointly
owned by Allegheny County and the City of Pittsburgh. 78 Every year, the
city placed a large Christmas tree outside a building shared by the two
governments. 79 A sign accompanied the tree and bore the title "Salute to
Liberty."80 The display also included an eighteen-foot tall menorah in cel-
ebration of the Jewish holiday of Hanukkah.8 1 The plaintiffs specifically
challenged the constitutionality of the menorah in this display. 82
a. The Plurality Opinion
A majority of the Allegheny Court agreed that the nativity display was
improper. 83 But the majority could not agree on the proper analysis by
76. See id. at 581 (describing uses of Grand Staircase). The Staircase was the
"most beautiful and most public" part of the courthouse. Id. at 579 (internal quo-
tations omitted). The caroling program took place over the lunch hour each
weekday for a three-week period. See id. at 581 (detailing uses to which county put
area around creche display). The plaintiffs did not challenge the constitutionality
of the caroling program. See id. at 588 n.37 (noting scope of plaintiffs' constitu-
tional challenges). The county dedicated the caroling program to world peace
and to families of prisoners-of-war and soldiers missing in action from the war in
Southeast Asia. See id. at 581 (recounting dedication attached to display).
77. See id. at 588 (summarizing plaintiffs' claim to permanently enjoin county
from displaying creche).
78. See id. at 581-82 (describing location of Christmas tree and menorah dis-
play). The display was situated outside the city's section of the building; however,
the opinion does not indicate that the county was in any way involved with this
display. See id.
79. See id. at 581-82 (noting that Christmas tree was approximately forty-five
feet in height).
80. See id. at 582 (describing display). The "Salute to Liberty" sign read: "Dur-
ing this holiday season, the city of Pittsburgh salutes liberty. Let these festive lights
remind us that we are the keepers of the flame of liberty and our legacy of free-
dom." Id.
81. See id. at 587. At eighteen feet in height, the menorah measured approxi-
mately half the size of the Christmas tree and was placed directly beside it. See id.
The tree, menorah and sign composed the full extent of the display. See id. at 581-
82 (noting that no other components were featured as part of holiday decor).
82. See id. at 587-88 (noting that plaintiffs sought to permanently enjoin city
from displaying menorah). The plaintiffs did not challenge the constitutionality
of the city's display of the Christmas tree. See id. at 588 n.37 (summarizing scope of
plaintiffs' constitutional challenges).
83. See id. at 599-600 (holding that "by permitting 'the display of the creche in
this particular physical setting' . .., the county sends an unmistakable message that
it supports and promotes the Christian praise to God that is the creche's religious
message" (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)). Although Justice Blackmun could not muster a majority of the Jus-
tices to subscribe to his section of the opinion applying the endorsement test, a
majority of the Court did agree that "[n]o viewer could reasonably think that [the
cr&he] occupies [its position on the Grand Staircase] without the support and
[Vol. 51: p. 379
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which to reach that determination. 8 4 In his opinion announcing the judg-
ment of the Court, Justice Blackmun applied the endorsement test, as ar-
ticulated by Justice O'Connor in Lynch.85 Employing a similar context
analysis, a majority allowed the tree and menorah display to remain. 86 In
so holding, the Court, though not by a conclusive majority, placed its seal
of approval on the endorsement test.
87
b. Justice O'Connor's Allegheny Concurrence
In a concurring opinion in Allegheny, Justice O'Connor described with
more specificity than the plurality the role of the reasonable observer and
the display's context in the endorsement test analysis. 88 Stating that gov-
ernment endorsement depends on the specific context of each case, Jus-
tice O'Connor noted that, under certain circumstances, the government
may constitutionally acknowledge religion. 89 Nevertheless, acknowledge-
approval of the government." See id. (finding majority support for proposition that
reasonable observer would be incapable of believing that county did not impermis-
sibly endorse religion by displaying nativity).
84. See id. at 593-97 (plurality opinion) (discussing plurality's application of
Justice O'Connor's endorsement test to challenged display).
85. See id. (applying endorsement test to context to conduct analysis of
creche). Justice Blackmun opined:
[T]he government's use of religious symbolism is unconstitutional if it
has the effect of endorsing religious beliefs, and the effect of the govern-
ment's use of religious symbolism depends upon its context .... [W]e
must ascertain whether the challenged governmental action is sufficiently
likely to be perceived by adherents of the controlling denominations as
an endorsement, and by the nonadherents as a disapproval, of their indi-
vidual religious choices.
Id. at 597 (internal quotations omitted).
86. See id. at 620 (majority opinion) (upholding display outside building
shared by city and county governments). A majority of the Court held that individ-
uals were not "sufficiently likely" to perceive the tree and menorah display as a
government establishment of religion. Id. (discussing rationale of Court's ruling).
As such, the display was permitted to remain. See id. at 621.
87. See id. at 596-97 (plurality opinion) (acknowledging importance of en-
dorsement test and display context in Establishment Clause cases).
88. See id. at 630-31 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (opining that reasonable ob-
server is aware of history and religious implications of symbols incorporated in
display). Though the Court had considered the reasonable observer in the past,
Allegheny represents the seminal application of the Court's reasonable observer
analysis. See Seidman, supra note 66, at 230-31 (describing evolution that took
place when Justice Blackmun's plurality opinion in Allegheny recognized signifi-
cance of reasonable observer).
89. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 629-30 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("To be sure,
the endorsement test depends on a sensitivity to the unique circumstances and
context of a particular challenged practice and, like any test that is sensitive to
context, it may not always yield results with unanimous agreement at the mar-
gins."). Justice O'Connor specifically noted that the government acknowledge-
ment of religion is particularly appropriate where the acknowledgement
solemnizes a public occasion. See id. at 630 (affirming importance of allowing gov-
ernment and religion to interact under certain circumstances). Appropriate sol-
emnization includes government practices such as the Court opening its session
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ment becomes improper when a reasonable observer would conclude that
the "challenged governmental practice conveys a message of endorsement
of religion," provided that the observer was aware of the secular under-
tones of the specific display, the unique history of the specific display and
the popular social attitudes toward religion.
90
Addressing the oft-raised justification of historical acceptance of a
given governmental display, Justice O'Connor stated that history is one of
many relevant components of the endorsement inquiry.9 1 Yet history
alone cannot justify a challenged governmental action; instead history
holds relevance insofar as it forms part of the social and cultural fabric of
which the reasonable observer is aware when determining whether a dis-
play communicates a message of endorsement.9 2
3. The Reasonable Observer Becomes Culturally Conscious: Developments Since
Allegheny
Since Allegheny, the scope of the reasonable observer's experi-
ence-and arguments over it-has grown substantially.93  Wallace v.
with the phrase "God save the United States and this honorable Court" and public
prayers at the opening of legislative sessions. See id. (illustrating constitutional
methods by which religion adds solemnity to public events). For a more thorough
catalogue of the appropriate use of religious symbolism to solemnize governmen-
tal actions, see Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2862-63 (2005) (enumerating
federal buildings in which Ten Commandments or religious symbols are incorpo-
rated into architectural design); McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2750
(2005) (listing governmental uses of religious symbolism in general society, includ-
ing Pledge of Allegiance and national motto "In God We Trust").
90. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 630-31 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting
that when determining whether government action conveys message of endorse-
ment, reasonable observer is aware of religious and cultural history as well as spe-
cific history of challenged government act).
91. See id. at 631 (suggesting that reasonable observer understands that many
originally religious symbols have come to hold secular meaning).
92. Cf id. (stating that reasonable observer would not perceive public
Thanksgiving holiday as communicating message of endorsement because ob-
server is aware that, although holiday has religious roots, it has come to be under-
stood as celebration of patriotic values rather than religious belief).
93. See infra notes 97-110 and accompanying text (outlining disagreement
about scope of reasonable observer's experience between Justice O'Connor and
Justice Stevens in Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753
(1995)). Justice O'Connor suggests that the reasonable observer possesses general
knowledge about the nature, history and site of a religious display on government
property. See infra notes 104, 107 (delineating reasonable observer's experience as
defined by justice O'Connor). On the other hand, the reasonable observer cre-
ated by Justice Stevens possesses minimal knowledge outside that which can be
ascertained by simply observing the display. See infra notes 101, 108 (outlining
Justice Stevens's arguments for relatively narrow scope of reasonable observer's
experience).
While Justices Stevens and O'Connor's positions encapsulate the debate over
the reasonable observer on the Court, academics have also sparred over the scope
of the reasonable observer's experience. Compare Choper, supra note 69, at 526-27
(faulting use of tort law reasonableness in adjudicating Establishment Clause ques-
tions because, unlike in negligence law, challenged violations of Establishment
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Jaffree9 4 involved a challenge to three Alabama statutes collectively requir-
ing a moment of silence at the beginning of each public school day for the
express purpose of silent prayer.95 Concurring in the Court's invalidation
of the statute, Justice O'Connor attributed to the reasonable observer
knowledge of the text, legislative history and implementation of the stat-
ute, in addition to the cultural history imputed to the observer in
Allegheny. 9
6
Perhaps the greatest disagreement over the breadth of the reasonable
observer's experience came in Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v.
Pinette.97 The case challenged the constitutionality of allowing the Ku
Klux Klan (KKK) to place unattended crosses on state-owned property. 98
The majority upheld the display because the KKK had privately created
the crosses and had placed them in a public forum traditionally used for
the open expression of ideas.
99
Clause seldom-if ever-appear manifestly unreasonable to community in which
they appear), and B. Jessie Hill, Putting Religious Symbolism in Context: A Linguistic
Critique of the Endorsement Test, 104 MIcH. L. REv. 491, 506-07 (2005) (summarizing
scholarly criticism of Court in neglecting to define whether observer is member of
religious mainstream or religious minority and suggesting that religious offense
based on reasonableness is too subjective to constitute constitutionally redressable
injury), with Jordan C. Budd, Cross Purposes: Remedying the Endorsement of Symbolic
Religious Speech, 82 DENY. U. L. REv. 183, 216, 256-57 (2004) (arguing that reasona-
ble observer provides consistent and coherent framework within which to evaluate
Establishment Clause issues but proffering revisions to method Court uses to pre-
scribe remedies upon finding constitutional violation), and Richard Collin Man-
grum, Shall We Sing? Shall We Sing Religious Music in Public Schools?, 38 CREIGHTON
L. REv. 815, 832-33, 866-70 (2005) (describing usefulness of contextual analysis
under endorsement test when evaluating whether public school choirs should be
permitted to perform religious music).
For a novel analysis of the use of context in Establishment Clause challenges,
see Hill, supra (examining Establishment Clause cases through post-modern lin-
guistic theory). Hill suggests that subjectively perceived interpretations of a dis-
play's meaning and context have led to ad hoc Establishment Clause decisions. See
id. at 514-15 (drawing on writings of post-modem philosophers Jacques Derrida
andJ.L. Austin to suggest that meaning is inherently dependent on context, which
itself is inherently unstable). Hill further argues that a presumption against relig-
ious displays on government property would add a degree of clarity absent in pre-
sent jurisprudence even though it would not fully resolve the issue. See id. at 539-
44 (explaining benefits of presumption of invalidity of religious displays in Estab-
lishment Clause cases).
94. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
95. See id. at 40. (quoting statutes' language indicating moment of silence was
for "meditation or voluntary prayer"). One of the statutes also allowed "teachers to
lead 'willing students' in a prescribed prayer to 'Almighty God ... the Creator and
Supreme Judge of the world.'" Id. (omission in original).
96. See id. at 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (defining scope of reasonable ob-
server's knowledge).
97. 515 U.S. 753 (1985).
98. See id. at 758-59 (describing displays proposed by Ku Klux Klan (KKK)).
99. See id. at 770 ("Religious expression cannot violate the Establishment
Clause where it (1) is purely private and (2) occurs in a traditional or designated
public forum, publicly announced and open to all on equal terms.").
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The heart of the controversy over the reasonable observer's experi-
ence in Pinette took place between the dissenting and concurring opinions
of Justices Stevens and O'Connor, respectively. 10 0 Justice Stevens argued
that the reasonable observer must be understood as a nonmember of the
religious creed advanced by the display.10 1 Further, in his formulation of
the reasonable observer, the observer possesses only information available
from physically viewing the display. 10 2 Using these standards, Justice Ste-
vens suggested that "[i] f a reasonable person could perceive a government
endorsement of religion from a private display, then the State may not
allow its property to be used as a forum for that display."
10 3
In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor maintained that a reasonable
observer has a more extensive scope of experience than suggested byJus-
tice Stevens.1 0 4 Justice O'Connor eschewed the notion that the endorse-
ment test protects particular individuals and defined the reasonable
observer more broadly: "[Tihe applicable observer is similar to the 'rea-
sonable person' in tort law, who 'is not to be identified with any ordinary
individual, who might occasionally do unreasonable things,' but is 'rather
a personification of a community ideal of reasonable behavior, deter-
mined by the [collective] social judgment."' 10 5 Given this "collective so-
cial judgment," Justice O'Connor concluded that the reasonable observer
is at least aware of the general history of the site of the display as well as
the history and context of the community in which the display sits; this
inherently indicates that the observer possesses awareness of information
beyond what appears in the display itself.
10 6
100. See id. at 778-81 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing in favor of imput-
ing broad experience to reasonable observer); id. at 799-801 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that reasonable observer's experience should be relatively narrow).
101. See id. at 800 n.5. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting narrow scope of
experience for reasonable observer). Justice Stevens argued that, while imputing a
broad knowledge base to the reasonable observer may protect "ideal" well-in-
formed, educated individuals, this standard does not consider the perceptions of
those whose knowledge falls below this "ideal" level. See id. (arguing that Establish-
ment Clause should be construed to protect even those without extensive knowl-
edge of community moorings and ideals). According to Justice Stevens, to protect
the rights of all individuals the reasonable observer should be imputed with rela-
tively little knowledge. See id. (justifying narrow scope of reasonable observer's
experience).
102. See id. (describing rationale for narrow scope of reasonable observer's
experience).
103. Id. at 799-800 (stating that government should not be permitted to use
its property in any way that communicates endorsement of religion to individual
with relatively little information about display).
104. See id. at 781 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that reasonable ob-
server is equivalent of informed member of community, who would have knowl-
edge significantly beyond that garnered solely from viewing display).
105. Id. at 779-80 (quoting W. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 175 (5th ed. 1984)) (suggesting similarity between reasonable ob-
server and tort law's reasonable person).
106. See id. at 780-81 (explaining scope of reasonable observer's experience).
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With such information included in the realm of the reasonable ob-
server's experience, authority exists to conclude that the scope of the rea-
sonable observer includes the following: the social and cultural heritage of
American society; the religious history of the American culture; the histori-
cal and cultural significance of the religious icon on display; the history
and significance of the site on which the display sits; and the text, legisla-
tive history and implementation of the statute or government act that
caused the display to be created. 10 7 This extensive scope of experience
caused Justice Stevens to suggest that Justice O'Connor's reasonable ob-
server "comes off as a well schooled jurist" rather than a reasonable repre-
sentation of American society. 10 8 Precedent expanding the experience of
the reasonable observer and confusion involving the continued relevance
of Lemon have led some commentators to express frustration with inconsis-
tencies in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.' 0 9 Likewise, the varied
scope of the reasonable observer's knowledge combined with the numer-
ous tests for constitutionality have made the issue of Ten Commandments
displays on public property an unsettled and contentious area of law.' 10
107. See id. at 779-81 (arguing that reasonable observer is aware of social and
cultural significance of object displayed as well as historical context of site of dis-
play); Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 630-31 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(suggesting that reasonable observer is aware of general religious and cultural his-
tory as well as specific history of display); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985)
(O'Connor,J., concurring) (stating that reasonable observer is aware of text, legis-
lative history and implementation of statute). This Note does not argue that all of
the information Justice O'Connor imputes to the reasonable observer should actu-
ally be accorded to the observer. See infra notes 156-60 (suggesting factors that
influence extent of experience and knowledge that should be imputed to reasona-
ble observer). The extensive citations to Justice O'Connor's opinions do, however,
indicate the extent to which her concurrences have affected the direction of Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence. See Neal R. Stoll & Shepard Goldfein, Antitrust
Trade and Practice; The Adventures of Antitrust and Harriet (Miers), N.Y.L.J., Oct. 18,
2005, at 3 (observing that, with her retirement, 'Justice O'Connor will leave be-
hind a legacy defined by the key votes she cast on . . . Establishment Clause
[issues]").
108. See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 800 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (objecting tojus-
tice O'Connor's formulation of reasonable observer because "[h]er 'reasonable
person' comes off as a well-schooled jurist, a being finer than the tort-law model").
109. See Choper, supra note 69, at 513-14 (noting that "ad hoc" approach to
reasonable observer's experience has sacrificed predictability in Supreme Court's
Establishment Clause cases (quoting Steven G. Gey, Religious Coercion and the Estab-
lishment Clause, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 463, 478-79)). But see Gershengorn, supra note
12, at 8 (observing that, in area of context-based Establishment Clause tests, "there
is little to suggest mass confusion in the lower courts . . ., which seem generally to
be able to separate the permissible from the impermissible"). For a description of
the extent of knowledge that various courts of appeals have imputed to the reason-
able observer, see Julie Van Groningen, Note, Thou Shalt Reasonably Focus on Its
Context: Analyzing Public Displays of the Ten Commandments, 39 VAL. U. L. REvx. 219,
220 (2004) (listing approaches of several circuit courts of appeals toward endorse-
ment test). See also supra note 71 (listing courts of appeals that have adopted en-
dorsement test).
110. See Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646,
662 (1980) (conceding that approach under Lemon "sacrifices clarity and predict-
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III. THE CAPITOL AND THE COURTHOUSE: THE CONTEXT-BASED
OUTCOMES OF VAN ORDEN AND McCREARY
A. Affirming the Texas Capitol Commandments Monument:
Van Orden v. Perry
1. Facts of Van Orden
In Van Orden, a citizen challenged the propriety of a Ten Command-
ments monument at the Texas state capitol complex.1 1 Donated by the
Fraternal Order of Eagles in 1961, the monument displayed the Com-
mandments along with religious and patriotic symbols.1 1 2 The monu-
ment, positioned on the northwestern side of the mall between the capitol
and state supreme court buildings, was one of seventeen monuments and
twenty-one historical markers on the capitol complex grounds. 113 Despite
the number of monuments, no consistent artistic or architectural design
unified the memorials into a common aesthetic theme.' 14 Nevertheless,
ability for flexibility"); Choper, supra note 69, at 513 (arguing that lack of "clear
consensus" on scope of reasonable observer's knowledge and religious convictions
has contributed to inconsistency in Establishment Clause cases).
111. See Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2858 (2005) (plurality opinion)
(describing procedural posture). Petitioner Thomas Van Orden, a native Texan
and attorney, had encountered the monument repeatedly since 1995 while visiting
the capitol complex to use the law library in the Texas Supreme Court building.
See id. (describing plaintiffs exposure to monument). Justice Thomas noted that
the only alleged injury sustained by Van Orden was the offense he took to the
monument:
The only injury to [Van Orden] is that he takes offense at seeing the
monument as he passes it on his way to the Texas Supreme Court Library.
He need not stop to read it or even to look at it, let alone to express
support for it or adopt the Commandments as guides for his life.
Id. at 2865 (Thomas, J., concurring).
112. See id. at 2858 (plurality opinion) (noting that monument measured ap-
proximately six feet in height and three and one-half feet in width). In addition to
the Ten Commandments, the monument depicted an eagle clutching the Ameri-
can flag, an Eye of Providence or All-Seeing Eye, the carving of two stone tablets,
two Stars of David and the Greek letters Chi and Rho, the initials of Christ. See id.
(listing engravings on monument). The bottom of the monument recognized its
donor and was carved with the message "Presented to the People and Youth of
Texas by the Fraternal Order of Eagles of Texas 1961." Id. For a picture of the
challenged monument, see id. at 2891 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Appendix to Opin-
ion of Stevens, J.), available at http://www.tspb.state.tx.us/spb/gallery/MonuList/
I0.htm.
113. See id. at 2858 (plurality opinion) (describing geographic location of
monument). For a map showing the precise location of the monument, see id. at
2873 (Breyer, J., concurring) (Appendix B to Opinion of Breyer, J.), available at
http://www.tspb.state.tx.us/SPB/Plan/FloorPlan/pdf/Grounds.pdf.
114. See id. at 2895 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that although Texas ar-
gued monuments must be interpreted as unified group of symbols, "anyone stroll-
ing around the lawn would surely take each memorial on its own terms without any
dawning sense that some purpose held the miscellany together more coherently
than fortuity and the edge of the grass"). The State commissioned the first monu-
ment, which was erected in 1891; the most recent addition to the monument dis-
plays was dedicated in 1999. See State Preservation Board: Caretakers of the Texas
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according to the State, the series of monuments and historical markers
commemorated the "people, ideals, and events that compose Texan iden-
tity." 115 Van Orden was the first challenge to the monument in its forty-
year history.' 16 The United States District Court for the Western District
of Texas conducted a reasonable observer analysis and allowed the monu-
ment to remain. 71 7 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit affirmed. 
18
2. The Court's Rationale in Van Orden
The Van Orden plurality discussed the applicability of the Lemon test,
noting that it has been spottily applied.1 19 The Court also restated its ear-
lier ambivalence with Lemon, suggesting that the decision provides little
more than "helpful signposts" on the road toward reaching a decision in
an Establishment Clause case. 120 The plurality further stated that Lemon is
"not useful in dealing with the sort of passive monument that Texas has
erected on its Capitol grounds."' 2 '
The plurality also forwent an endorsement analysis, instead relying on
a historical framework and suggesting that "our analysis is driven both by
the nature of the monument and by our Nation's history."1 22 Because Texas
Capitol, Online Gallery Monument Guide, http://www.tspb.state.tx.us/spb/gal-
lery/MonuList/MonuList.htm (follow "Texas Peace Officers Memorial" hyperlink)
(last visited Oct. 19, 2005) (providing information on monuments on Texas capi-
tol grounds).
115. See Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2858 (plurality opinion) (quoting H. Con.
Res. 38, 77th Leg. (Tex. 2001)) (restating monument's propriety as representative
of cultural and social ideals).
116. See id. at 2870 (Breyer, J., concurring) (summarizing history of monu-
ment by stating that "[forty] years passed in which the presence of this monument,
legally speaking, went unchallenged").
117. See Van Orden v. Perry, No. A-01-CA-833-H, 2002 WL 32737462, at *5
(W.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2002) (employing reasonable observer analysis to conclude
"[n]either the location nor the physical characteristics of the Ten Commandments
monument would lead a reasonable observer to conclude that the State is seeking
to advance, endorse or promote religion by permitting its display"), affd, 351 F.3d
173 (5th Cir. 2003), affd, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005).
118. See Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173, 182 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that
"we are persuaded that Texas does not violate the First Amendment by retaining a
forty-two-year-old display of the decalogue"), affd, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005).
119. See Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2861 (plurality opinion) (citing examples of
cases declining to apply the Lemon test, including Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536
U.S. 639 (2002), and Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98
(2001)). For a summary of Zelman, Milford and other cases foregoing a Lemon anal-
ysis, see supra note 52.
120. See Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2860 (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734,
741 (1973)) (noting that elements of Lemon test "are no more than helpful sign-
posts" in Establishment Clause analysis).
121. See id. at 2861 (noting uncertainty in future applicability of Lemon after
noting that much of its history has involved governmental attempts to establish
religion-including prayer-in public schools).
122. See id. at 2861-63 (illustrating historical acceptance of commingling relig-
ious doctrine with formation of government law and policy) (emphases added).
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treated its capitol monuments as representative of state history, the Court
determined that the display had a "dual significance, partaking of both
religion and government."1 23 The secular significance of the Command-
ments, the Court held, did not violate the Establishment Clause.
124
In a concurring opinion, Justice Breyer noted that clear Establish-
ment Clause cases, such as those involving government coercion, are easy
to decide but rarely arise. 125 It is borderline cases that present a diffi-
culty. 126 Indeed, Justice Breyer noted, in such cases, there is no "test-re-
lated substitute for the exercise of legal judgment."' 2 7 He stressed that
"legal judgment" does not mean the personal values of judges; rather, it
requires an analysis faithful to the context of the challenged government
act and of the Framers' intent in adopting the Establishment Clause. 1 28 In
the case of the Texas monument, which, Justice Breyer noted, stood for
more than forty years, the challenged display would also have satisfied the
more formal Lemon test, had the plurality chosen to apply it. 1 29
Specifically cited examples of historical acceptance of the interwoven role of relig-
ion in government include President George Washington's Thanksgiving Day
Proclamation, the statues of Moses and the Apostle Paul displayed in the rotunda
of the Library of Congress's Jefferson Building and the sculpture depicting the
Ten Commandments and a cross outside the federal courthouse of the United
States Court of Appeals and District Court for the District of Columbia. See id.
(listing examples of appropriate meshing between government and religion).
123. Id. at 2864.
124. See id. (allowing Commandments monument to remain on Texas state
capitol grounds).
125. See id. at 2869 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that "[i]f the relation be-
tween government and religion is one of separation, but not of mutual hostility
and suspicion, one will inevitably find difficult borderline cases").
126. See id. (noting difficulty of determining what approach is neutral). In
such cases, neutrality alone is not sufficient to guide the judgment of government
action because "it is sometimes difficult to determine when a legal rule is 'neu-
tral."' See id. (acknowledging one difficulty with neutrality analysis). Justice Breyer
also noted that an overly zealous attempt to remain devoted to the principle of
neutrality may, in fact, create a system adverse or hostile to religion by essentially
favoring passive and irreligious belief systems to religious ones. See id. (explaining
potential danger of neutrality-only analysis).
127. Id. Justice Breyer delineated limits on the scope of the legal judgment of
which he wrote, explaining that it is not unbridled personal judgment, but judg-
ment soundly rooted in accepted legal theory. See id. (suggesting that "in all con-
stitutional cases, judgment] must reflect and remain faithful to the underlying
purposes of the [Religion] Clauses, and it must take account of context and conse-
quences measured in light of those purposes").
128. See id. (noting relevancy of context as well as recognition of original in-
tent behind Religion Clauses to inquiry into display's constitutionality). But cf id.
at 2865 (Thomas,J., concurring) (suggesting that coercion-only approach to Estab-
lishment Clause issues would simplify analytical task and more faithfully realize
intent of Framers).
129. See id. at 2871 (Breyer, J., concurring) (proffering that more formal
Lemon rubric would not have required removal of monument). Justice Breyer
noted that the display was located on the capitol grounds rather than in view of
schoolchildren, "where, given the impressionability of the young, government
must exercise particular care in separating church and state." See id. (observing
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B. Removing the Kentucky Courthouse Displays: McCreary County v. ACLU
1. Facts of McCreary
In McCreary County v. ACLU, two Kentucky counties posted gold-
framed copies of the Ten Commandments on the hallway walls of their
courthouses. 31 The displays were readily visible to citizens entering the
courthouse for administrative and judicial purposes. 13 ' The ACLU sued
to enjoin the displays of the Commandments, alleging they violated the
Establishment Clause. 132 The trial court granted a preliminary injunction
requiring removal of the displays pending the outcome of the
litigation. 13
3
Before issuance of the injunction, the counties revised the displays in
an attempt to create collages that would meet constitutional require-
ments.13 4 While the first set of displays featured solely the Ten Command-
that Court has exercised especially close scrutiny of statutes that arguably establish
religion in public schools because of risk of indoctrinating impressionable chil-
dren). He also stated that the monument's existence at the complex had not bred
Establishment Clause issues at any time during its decades-long history. See id. at
2870-71 (suggesting that forty years during which monument stood unchallenged
suggested that visitors to capitol understood monument as part of moral and his-
torical context). Therefore, justice Breyer concluded: "I believe that the Texas
display-serving a mixed but primarily nonreligious purpose, not primarily 'ad-
vanc[ing]' or 'inhibit[ing] religion,' and not creating an 'excessive government
entanglement with religion,'-might satisfy this Court's more formal Establish-
ment Clause tests." Id. at 2871 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13
(1971)) (alteration in original).
130. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2728 (2005) (describing
location of displays).
131. See id. (noting that citizens had to pass display to reach offices where they
could obtain or renew driver's licenses, apply for various permits, register vehicles,
pay taxes and register to vote).
132. See id. at 2729 (noting parties to suit). Defendants in the case were the
Kentucky Counties of McCreary and Pulaski. See id. at 2728 (noting counties' first
created displays in summer 1999).
133. See ACLU v. McCreary County, 96 F. Supp. 2d 679, 691 (E.D. Ky. 2000)
(ordering that "the Ten Commandments display shall be removed from the Mc-
Creary County Courthouse IMMEDIATELY' and that no county officials "shall
erect or cause to be erected similar displays"), supp. prelim. injunction granted, 145 F.
Supp. 2d 845 (E.D. Ky. 2001), affd, 354 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2003), aff'd, 125 S. Ct.
2722 (2005); ACLU v. Pulaski County, 96 F. Supp. 2d 691, 703 (E.D. Ky. 2000)
(ordering same with respect to Pulaski County), supp. prelim. injunction granted sub
nom., ACLU v. McCreary County, 145 F. Supp. 2d 845 (E.D. Ky. 2001), aff'd, 354
F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2003), affd, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005).
134. See McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2729-31 (recounting that, after institution of
suit, legislative institutions of each county authorized revisions to the displays).
The district court granted the preliminary injunction against the second set of
displays. See id. at 2729 (noting that district court granted preliminary injunction
within one month of filing of suit). Rather than removing the displays, the coun-
ties revised them a second time. See id. at 2730 (noting that this constituted third
set of displays sponsored by counties within one year). The court issued a supple-
mental injunction requiring removal of these third displays despite their expanded
content. See id. at 2731 (summarizing that district court granted ACLU's motion to
supplement preliminary injunction to enjoin these new displays).
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ments, the second pair incorporated several other documents
representing the state's "precedent legal code." 1 35 The Ten Command-
ments hung at the center of the second display in the gold frames used for
the first display, which were larger than those that held the other docu-
ments. 136 All of the documents chosen for inclusion featured references
to the existence of God.' 3 7 The counties later changed the displays again,
featuring the Ten Commandments along with eight other equally sized
documents.138 This final pair of displays contained some-but not all-of
the same documents from the previous revision. 139 The Court of Appeals
135. See id. at 2729 (describing second set of displays).
136. See id. at 2728-30 (describing contents of display). The second displays
retained the large gold-frame posters of the Ten Commandments from the King
James Version of the Bible. See id. at 2729 (noting that Ten Commandments were
larger than all other documents in second set of displays). In addition, the dis-
plays contained the following:
[T] he "endowed by their Creator" passage from the Declaration of Inde-
pendence; the Preamble to the Constitution of Kentucky; the national
motto, "In God We Trust"; a page from the Congressional Record of Feb-
ruary 2, 1983, proclaiming the Year of the Bible and including a state-
ment of the Ten Commandments; a proclamation by President Abraham
Lincoln designating April 30, 1863, a National Day of Prayer and Humili-
ation; an excerpt from President Lincoln's "Reply to Loyal Colored Peo-
ple of Baltimore upon Presentation of a Bible," reading that "[t] he Bible
is the best gift God has ever given to man"; a proclamation by President
Reagan marking 1983 the Year of the Bible; and the Mayflower Compact.
Id. at 2729-30 (second alteration in original).
137. See id. at 2730 (quoting district court's observation that "the 'Count[ies]
narrowly tailored [their] selection of foundational documents to incorporate only
those with specific references to Christianity"').
138. See id. at 2729-31 (describing third and final set of displays). The final
displays, entitled "The Foundations of American Law and Government Display,"
featured the Ten Commandments along with "framed copies of the Magna Carta,
the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights, the lyrics of the Star Spangled
Banner, the Mayflower Compact, the National Motto, the Preamble to the Ken-
tucky Constitution, and a picture of Lady Justice." Id. at 2731. Accompanying
each document was a description of its significance in the American legal tradi-
tion. See id. (describing components of display). The Ten Commandments com-
mentary read:
The Ten Commandments have profoundly influenced the formation of
Western legal thought and the formation of our country. That influence
is clearly seen in the Declaration of Independence, which declared that
"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,
that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness." The
Ten Commandments provide the moral background of the Declaration
of Independence and the foundation of our legal tradition.
Id.
139. To compare the content of the second and third sets of displays, see
supra notes 136, 138. The trial court extended its original preliminary injunction
to include a supplemental injunction requiring removal of the altered displays. See
ACLU v. McCreary County, 145 F. Supp. 2d 845, 853 (E.D. Ky. 2001) (quoting
district court's opinion, which stated that "IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiff's mo-
tion to extend the preliminary injtnction to the current displays is GRANTED
[and that] the displays shall be removed from the McCreary and Pulaski County
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for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the grant of the preliminary injunc-
tion.' 40
2. The Court's Rationale in McCreary
The McCreary majority gave greater deference to the Lemon test than
did the plurality in Van Orden.14 1 The Court acknowledged that neutrality
between religion and nonreligion has always guided Establishment Clause
analysis. 142 It then examined whether the counties' displays indicated gov-
ernmental intent to favor one faith over another, essentially conducting
the purpose analysis of the Lemon test.
14 3
Yet despite its discussion of intent, the majority did not specifically
consider the purpose criterion as part of a Lemon analysis.' 4 4 Instead, re-
sponding to the petitioner counties' argument that government scienter is
courthouses... IMMEDIATELY"), affd, 354 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2003), affd, 125 S.
Ct. 2722 (2005).
140. See ACLU v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438, 462 (6th Cir. 2003) (af-
firming district court's grant of injunction requiring removal of displays), affd, 125
S. Ct. 2722 (2005).
141. Compare McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2732-35 (discussing Lemon test and engag-
ing in purpose analysis from perspective of reasonable observer), with Van Orden
v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2860-61 (2005) (plurality opinion) (describing Lemon
criteria as "helpful signposts" in Establishment Clause analysis and pursuing histor-
ical analysis for determining propriety of challenged monument).
142. See McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2733 (describing neutrality between religious
and nonreligious sects as "touchstone" of First Amendment religious analysis).
143. See id. ("Manifesting a purpose to favor one faith over another, or adher-
ence to religion generally, clashes with the understanding reached . . .after de-
cades of religious war, that liberty and social stability demand a religious tolerance
that respects the religious views of all citizens." (quoting Zelman v. Simmons-Har-
ris, 536 U.S. 639, 718 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting)) (internal quotations omitted
and alteration in original).
144. See id. at 2734-35 (conducting purpose analysis, but pursuing such in-
quiry from purpose perceived by reasonable observer rather than government intent,
as prescribed by Lemon test). The counties argued for the abandonment of the
purpose criterion because governmental purpose is ultimately unknowable. See id.
at 2734 (rejecting counties' argument against purpose inquiry). The counties sug-
gested that, just as one can never truly discern the thoughts in the mind of an-
other, so too is one incapable of determining governmental purpose in carrying
out an official governmental act. See id. (ignoring counties' assertion that purpose
analysis is "merely an excuse for courts to act selectively and unpredictably in pick-
ing out evidence of subjective intent").
Though the Court was ultimately unconvinced by the counties' argued irrele-
vance of the purpose inquiry, it characterized the argument as "seismic." See id.
(acknowledging validity of counties' argument). The Court reaffirmed govern-
mental purpose as a "staple of statutory interpretation that makes up the daily fare
of every appellate court in the country" and as a "key element" of the Establish-
ment Clause analysis. See id. (affirming importance of governmental intent to eval-
uation of counties' displays). Though the Court never expressly admitted the
difficulty of discerning the actual purpose behind the counties' display of the Com-
mandments, it impliedly conceded the validity of this argument by converting the
purpose analysis into a reasonable observer test. See id. (conducting purpose analy-
sis from perspective of reasonable observer but failing to note difficulty inherent in
same inquiry when conducted from perspective of discerning government intent).
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ultimately unknowable, the Court reaffirmed the propriety of inquiring
into the governmental purpose behind the displays. 14 5 Rather than a
traditional examination of government scienter, however, the Court held
that the reasonable observer provides the proper perspective from which
to conduct the purpose analysis: "The eyes that look to purpose belong to
an objective observer, one who takes account of the traditional external
signs that show up in the text, legislative history, and implementation of
the statute or comparable official act."'
46
Invoking this equivalent of the endorsement test, the Court upheld
the injunction requiring removal of the displays. 14 7 The Court noted that
throughout the counties' revisions, the documents selected for inclusion
consistently contained religious references and that the counties excluded
documents that they might have more relevantly displayed. 14 8 Given the
nature of the counties' selections and the specific history of multiple revi-
sions to the particular displays, the Court determined that the reasonable
observer would perceive that the counties had a primary purpose of dis-
Faced with the difficulty of subjectively determining governmental purpose,
the Court held that "scrutinizing purpose.. . make [s] practical sense ... where an
understanding of official objective emerges from readily discoverablefact .... The eyes
that look to purpose belong to an objective observer." Id. (emphases added). In so
holding, the Court essentially merged the Lemon inquiry with the endorsement
test, affirming that the most logical perspective from which to conduct establish-
ment analyses is that of the reasonable observer. See id. (conducting purpose anal-
ysis of Lemon test through eyes of reasonable observer of endorsement test).
145. See id. (noting that scrutiny of purpose is possible through objective anal-
ysis of reasonable observer). While it may be objectively true that, in the cognitive
sense, government cannot formulate intent in the same way as individuals, the
Court held that the context of government actions provides sufficient information
to allow courts to make objective determinations of government intent. See id. (de-
clining counties' invitation to forgo purpose analysis and noting "[t]here is ...
nothing hinting at an unpredictable or disingenuous exercise when a court en-
quires into purpose after a claim is raised under the Establishment Clause").
146. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
147. See id. at 2741 ("[Ifl the [reasonable] observer had not thrown up his
hands [after considering the counties' displays], he would probably suspect that
the Counties were simply reaching for any way to keep a religious document on
the walls of courthouses constitutionally required to embody religious neutrality.")
(footnote omitted). To compare the Court's reliance on the reasonable observer
with Justice O'Connor's original formulation of the endorsement test, see supra
text accompanying note 67 (laying foundation for endorsement test).
148. See McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 274041 (questioning consistency of counties'
selection of documents with their avowed purpose of representing foundational
documents of American law and government). As an illustration of the incon-
gruity of the counties' labeling of the chosen documents as "foundational" to the
American governmental system, the Court noted that the counties' copy of the
Magna Carta of 1215 displayed the provision that "fish-weirs shall be removed from
the Thames" but did not include copies of the Constitution of the United States
nor of the Fourteenth Amendment to it, two of the most essential documents in
the development of American jurisprudence. See id. at 2740 (observing that coun-
ties' stated purpose was irreconcilable with their actions).
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playing documents of religious significance. 149 Rejecting the counties'
contention that the displays were hung on the walls of the courthouse to
educate citizens about the foundational legal history of America, the
Court found that they violated the Establishment Clause and upheld the
preliminary injunction requiring their removal. 1 50
IV. IN THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER: THE CONTEXT TEST AS DERIVED FROM
THE VAN ORDEN AND McCREARY HOLDINGS
When understood in light of precedential decisions such as Lemon,
Lynch, Allegheny, Pinette and others, Van Orden and McCreary propose a con-
text-based extension of the endorsement test. 151 Together, Van Orden and
McCreary state that government may constitutionally display the Ten Com-
mandments where the geographic, physical and cultural context indicates
that the reasonable observer would not perceive a government attempt to
endorse religion. 152 Nevertheless, even if these objective criteria superfi-
cially indicate a lack of government endorsement, the display may still be
unconstitutional if the reasonable observer possessing knowledge of the
display's specific history of existence would conclude that the government
erected the display to endorse or advance religion.
1 53
149. See id. at 2740-41 (noting that reasonable observer would likely have been
puzzled by strange mdlange of documents included in counties' foundations
displays).
150. See id. at 2745 (affirming court of appeals, which had affirmed district
court's grant of injunction).
151. For a description of the context test and its relation to the endorsement
test, see infra notes 152-67 and accompanying text.
152. See Van Orden v. Peny, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2861 (2005) (plurality opinion)
(stating that Establishment Clause analysis in Ten Commandments cases is con-
ducted in light of context, including nation's history and nature of display); see also
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 599-600 (1989) (employing reasonable observer
analysis to determine constitutionality of nativity and Christmas tree/menorah
displays).
153. See McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2741 (holding that reasonable observer would
suspect that counties had revised displays in order to place documents in court-
house "required to embody religious neutrality").
The holdings of Van Orden and McCreary provide further support for the
movement in Establishment Clause jurisprudence away from the purpose/effect/
entanglement Lemon test toward a perception-based analysis that focuses on
whether the reasonable observer would perceive such an establishment actually
occurring. See, e.g., ACLU v. Plattsmouth, 419 F.3d 772, 776-77 (8th Cir. 2005)
(reversing judgment of district court, which required removal of Ten Command-
ments monument from city-owned park, because court found context of monu-
ment indistinguishable from that of similar monument in Van Orden); Card v.
Everett, 386 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1176-77 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (granting city defen-
dant's motion for summary judgment, thereby allowing Ten Commandments
monument to remain on grounds of city hall complex, in part because "a casual
observer with knowledge of the monument's history that, when given the opportu-
nity, the City purposely reduced the prominence of this overtly religious monu-
ment" would conclude that monument communicated no improper religious
message); Russelburg v. Gibson County, No. 3:03-CV-149-RLY-WGH, 2005 WL
2175527, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 7, 2005) (allowing Ten Commandments monument
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From the holdings in Van Orden and McCreary emerges the following
two-part context test for adjudicating the constitutionality of Ten Com-
mandments displays: (1) From the perspective of the reasonable observer,
does the display's geographic, physical and cultural context-the combi-
nation of which this Note will label "geocultural context"-indicate an im-
proper religious purpose? 15 4 (2) If not, is the unique history of the
specific display so well-known and publicly disseminated in the community
that the reasonable observer living in the community would be aware of
that history and conclude that it belied a government intent to unconstitu-
tionally endorse religion? 15
5
A. Geocultural Context
By beginning with the geocultural context of a display, the first crite-
rion of the context test focuses on information available both from the
immediate surroundings of the display and the general knowledge of the
cultural context in which the display appears. 156 This approach assumes a
generally well-informed reasonable observer who possesses a cursory un-
derstanding of the cultural history surrounding the display.15 7 Thus, at
to remain on grounds of county courthouse because geographic context was simi-
lar to that of monument in Van Orden and monument had no contentious history
similar to displays in McCreary). The difference between the Lemon test and more
recent Establishment Clause analyses is one of perspective: the Court's earlier cases
require an examination of government scienter and/or purpose; the later cases
indicate an objective analysis of the message sent without focus on government
intent. See generally Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593-97 (1989); Lynch v. Don-
nelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-89 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Indeed, in Mc-
Creary, the Court noted that even if government purposefully intends to establish
religion, no constitutional violation occurs unless the attempted establishment is
actually perceived as such. See McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2735 (suggesting that, for
constitutional purposes, improper governmental purpose in displaying Command-
ments is significant only if reasonable observer would perceive that improper
purpose).
Lynch and Allegheny began the evolution of this process by first proposing and
then adopting the endorsement test. See supra notes 53-92 and accompanying text
(discussing holding and application of Lynch and Allegheny). Yet, as with much
Establishment jurisprudence, the endorsement test has been inconsistently ap-
plied; sometimes standing alone, sometimes within a Lemon analysis, sometimes
tacked on to the principle of neutrality. See Pongrace, III, supra note 49, at 217
(observing doctrinal fluctuations in Establishment Clause cases and noting emer-
gence of tests in addition to Lemon for evaluating challenged government action).
154. For a description of the elements of the geocultural context element of
the context test, see infra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
155. For a description of the elements of the specific history element of the
context test, see infra notes 161-67 and accompanying text.
156. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780
(1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that reasonable observer is knowledge-
able of physical surroundings and historical context in which display appears); see
also Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 631 (O'ConnorJ., concurring) (suggesting that reasona-
ble observer possesses awareness of cultural context of display).
157. See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 779-80 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (defining char-
acteristics of reasonable observer); id. at 800 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing
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the very least, the reasonable observer knows all facts that can be perceived
through viewing the display and reading any markings on it. 158 This as-
sumption also provides that the observer is aware of the nature of the
property on which the display sits. 159 Lastly, the reasonable observer pos-
sesses knowledge derived from the social milieu of the American culture,
such as the knowledge that the Ten Commandments represent a religious
tradition that has influenced the development of American life and history
since before the country's founding.
160
that scope of reasonable observer's experience should be less than that of model
"ideal" citizen); Freethought Soc'y of Greater Phila. v. Chester County, 334 F.3d
247, 259 (3d Cir. 2003) (affirming Third Circuit's adoption of Justice O'Connor's
formulation of reasonable observer). Although various opinions may disagree with
the precise scope of the reasonable observer's experience, they agree almost unan-
imously that, at the very least, the observer is aware of that which the observer can
directly perceive. See, e.g., Indiana Civil Liberties Union v. O'Bannon, 259 F.3d
766, 772-73 (7th Cir. 2001) (suggesting that reasonable observer has knowledge
only of information that can be sensorially perceived through government act).
158. See, e.g., Pinette, 515 U.S. at 800 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting
that reasonable observer possesses all information observed from display).
159. See, e.g., id. at 781 (O'ConnorJ., concurring) (proffering that "our hypo-
thetical observer also should know the general history of the place" in which chal-
lenged government display is situated).
160. See id. (arguing that reasonable observer is generally informed member
of relevant community). Not all opinions agree that the element of knowledge of
social moors should be attributed to the reasonable observer. See id. at 800 n.5
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (expressing discontent with Justice O'Connor's well-in-
formed observer). Nevertheless, the reasonable observer should be imputed with
cursory social knowledge because the goal of the context test is to evaluate the
Commandments display from the perception of a reasonable person. See Mc-
Creary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2740 (2005) (invalidating counties' court-
house displays because no reasonable observer could believe that counties lacked
objective of religious endorsement). Although many of the Establishment Clause
analyses undertaken by the Court may be abstract in nature, the challenged viola-
tions themselves rarely are: these displays are monuments that people pass every
day on their way to work, thatjudges and attorneys walk past regularly in the court-
house, that people see their government holding forth as a representation of its
constituency. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2858 (2005) (plurality
opinion) (describing monument challenged in that case precisely because of its
commanding physical presence at Texas state capitol). In this way, Establishment
Clause cases differ from more philosophical issues such as determining what rights
compose due process or whether probable cause exists for a seizure. See Allegheny,
492 U.S. at 656 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting
deficiency of cases prior to Allegheny for their inability to provide "concrete answers
to Establishment Clause questions"). Where the Ten Commandments are con-
cerned, people are able to directly see, touch or hear the challenged display. Cf
McCreay, 125 S. Ct. at 2735 (suggesting that no establishment violation would exist
where government created display to advance religion if advancement could not
actually be perceived). Therefore, the crux of any establishment analysis must fo-
cus on whether reasonable individuals are likely to perceive an inappropriate com-
mingling between government and religion. See id. (noting irrelevance of
improper government act if it is not perceived as such by individuals). The reason-
able observer must possess knowledge of the development of American history and
culture because to hold otherwise would be to replace the reasonable person with
an ignorant one, thereby subjecting the perception of the larger population to that
of a small group of individuals with a narrow knowledge base in this area. See
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B. Specific History
The second criterion of the test essentially determines whether the
unique history of the specific display should be considered in determining
whether a reasonable observer would deem the display unconstitu-
tional. 16 1 The second element asks: Is the unique history of the specific
display so well-known and so publicly discussed in the community that the
reasonable observer-if the observer lived in the community-would be
aware of it?162 In order to fall within the reasonable observer's scope of
knowledge, the specific history of the display must receive actual notoriety
through media coverage, public discussion or other similar means.1 6 3
If the unique history of the specific display has obtained widespread
notoriety, the latter criterion of the test asks whether that history indicates
such an egregious and overbearing attempt by the government to endorse
Pinette, 515 U.S. at 779 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting that point of rea-
sonableness inquiry is to reflect collective social ideals).
161. See McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2740-41 (suggesting that, in cases such as Mc-
Creay, reasonable observer would possess awareness of specific history of display to
conclude improper endorsement had taken place).
162. See id. at 2738-40 (including within reasonable observer's experience
knowledge of repeated revision to specific challenged display); Pinette, 515 U.S. at
780 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that reasonable observer is aware of "his-
tory and context of the community and forum in which the religious display ap-
pears"). Although Justice O'Connor's reasonable observer possesses more
extensive knowledge than the reasonable observer for which this Note argues, her
Pinette concurrence indicates that the scope of the reasonable observer extends at
least to include the specific history of the display if that history is widely publicized.
See id. at 781 (observing that reasonable observer would be aware that public park
was used by private speakers of various types in exercise of free speech).
163. See, e.g., Andrew Powell, Thou Shall Not to McCreary Commandments Display,
McCREARV COUNTY VOICE, June 30, 2005, available at http://www.tmcvoice.com/
Archives/063005/story3.html (reporting Court's upholding of injunction requir-
ing removal of displays in story that would satisfy specific history component of
context test). In McCreary, the Ten Commandments display received such notori-
ous infamy. See generally Joseph Gerth, Grayson Officials Ordered to Remove Command-
ments, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), May 17, 2002, at 01B (publicizing repetitious
district court orders requiring removal of displays from courthouses in McCreary
and Pulaski Counties); Nation in Brief WASH. PosT, May 18, 2000, at A28 (recount-
ing district court order mandating removal of Commandments displays pending
outcome of litigation); Nation in Brief/Kentucky; Ten Commandments Ordered Removed,
L.A. TIMES, May 6, 2000, at Al (reporting that district court ordered removal of
Commandments displays); Andrew Powell, Comandments [sic] Fight Not Over, Turns
towrd [sic] ACLU, McCREARY COUNTY VOICE, July 7, 2005, available at http://
www.tmcvoice.com/Archives/070705/cis.html (documenting response of propo-
nents of Commandments displays to ruling in McCreary upholding order requiring
removal of displays); Shannon Tangonan, Kentucky ACLU Director Vessels Is Leaving;
Organization Grew and Became More Visible During His Tenure, COURIER-J. (Louisville,
Ky.), Mar. 19, 2003, at 1B (describing litigation to remove courthouse Command-
ments displays as high profile case). Given such extensive public awareness, the
context test's reasonable observer would have had sufficient reason to conclude, as
the Court did, that the displays in McCreary represented an attempt by the govern-
ment to establish religion. See McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2741 (holding that counties
had attempted to endorse religion on "the walls of courthouses constitutionally
required to embody neutrality").
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a religious creed that the reasonable observer would believe that the dis-
play's specific history alone communicates an endorsement-even if not
communicated through the geocultural context of the display.16 4 A re-
quirement of substantial media attention to the display ensures that the
observer remains as true as possible to a representation that reflects a sam-
ple of the population that is as large as possible. 165 This high standard for
considering specific history is necessary in order for the reasonable ob-
server's experience to reflect the common experience of a broad sample
of the American population. 166 If the reasonable observer is to accurately
reflect the American public, the observer must be imputed only with
knowledge to which a large segment of that public is likely to have
access. 167
V. THOU SHALT (NOT) DISPLAY THE COMMANDMENTS: APPLYING THE
CONTEXT TEST
In her Lynch concurrence, Justice O'Connor noted that the problem
with Lemon is the difficulty of logically connecting concrete Establishment
Clause principles of preventing improper government endorsement of re-
ligion with the theoretical elements of the test itself.1 68 The context test
avoids this conundrum by focusing exclusively on issues of perceived estab-
lishment through the eye of the reasonable observer.169 Further, it avoids
the semantic challenge of attempting to define inherently cloudy issues
164. See McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2741 (noting that reasonable observer would
"throw[ ] up his hands" upon learning of multiple revisions to counties' displays).
165. See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 779 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting that
"the endorsement test creates a more collective standard to gauge the objective
meaning of the [government's] statement in the community") (alteration in origi-
nal and internal quotation omitted) (emphasis added).
166. See id. (noting that Establishment Clause inquiry should rest on broad
community standards).
167. See id. at 800 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that Establishment
Clause should be construed so as to "extend protection to the universe of reasona-
ble persons and ask whether some viewers of the religious display would be likely
to perceive a government endorsement"). But cf. id. at 779 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (disagreeing with statement that "the endorsement test should focus on the
actual perception of individual observers, who naturally have differing degrees of
knowledge").
168. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (noting disjuncture between Lemon and practical concerns of Establishment
Clause).
169. See Seidman, supra note 66, at 230-31 (describing experience of reasona-
ble observer throughout observer's evolution in Establishment Clause cases).
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such as entanglement. 170 It also renders unnecessary the difficulty of in-
quiring into institutional scienter to divine governmental purpose. 1
7 1
Elements of the previous tests remain components of the analytical
framework of the context test, but only by way of the concert of messages
that they send to the reasonable observer. 172 Rather than a bifurcated
analysis of several abstract components, the elements of the Lemon test are
relevant if they either alone or in consort communicate a message of en-
dorsement. 17 3 For instance, in Van Orden, the context test justifies the
170. See Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 656 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring) (noting that criteria of Lemon analysis are generally not effective in providing
concrete direction on Establishment Clause issues); see also Hunt v. McNair, 413
U.S. 734, 741 (1973) (describing Lemon as merely "helpful signposts" for analysis).
171. See Dokupil, supra note 2, at 623-27 (noting inconsistent roles that gov-
ernment purpose has played in analyses). In Lynch and Allegheny, no direct evi-
dence of secular purpose was available to the Court, but it inferred government
purpose from the context, eventually recognizing a legitimate secular purpose for
any display or government commingling with religion undertaken for the purpose
of "solemnizing public occasions ... and encouraging recognition of what is wor-
thy of appreciation." Id. at 622 (internal quotation omitted) (arguing that these
exceptions essentially render purpose analysis meaningless because almost any gov-
ernment action respecting religion can qualify for exception). This holding essen-
tially "broadened the definition of secular purpose to the point where nearly any
display should meet it." Id. Yet since the Court's decision in Stone v. Graham, 449
U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam), which held that the Ten Commandments were inher-
ently sacred and display of them belied a religious purpose, the purpose analysis
has become increasingly scattered. See Dokupil, supra note 2, at 628-29 (arguing
that in Stone, Court confronted "unique mixture of the sacred and secular in the
Ten Commandments," which fueled arguments of both those seeking to allow and
to ban Commandments in public sphere). Stone allowed lower federal courts to
"use secular purpose (or lack of it) as a vehicle for implementing their own judg-
ment as reasonable observers," resulting in many displays being found unconstitu-
tional despite a total lack of government expression of religious purpose. See id. at
630 (observing inconsistent effects of Stone). This parsing of the purpose analysis
has rendered it ineffective as a consistent determiner of the limits of constitution-
ality. Cf id. at 633 (suggesting that purpose inquiry should be eliminated from
Establishment Clause inquiry).
172. Cf Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of "Tests" Under the
Religion Clauses, 1995 Sup. CT. REV. 323, 361 ("The end of Lemon as such does not
eliminate [the] significance [of] precedents, though it may shake the foundations
of some [precedential cases].").
173. See Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. CT. REv.
1, 48 (noting that Establishment Clause jurisprudence "would seem to be the sole
doctrinal field in which intent, divorced from results, can lead to a finding of un-
constitutionality"). Admittedly, McConnell's statement is not as ironclad at it once
was, especially since the rise of the endorsement test. Cf McCreary County v.
ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2734 (conducting academic purpose inquiry from perspec-
tive of reasonable observer). Yet even in the era of the endorsement test, the
Court has sometimes found it difficult to unite its academic analysis with events or
perceptions that make a government act unconstitutional. See, e.g., Lynch, 465 U.S.
at 688-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting disconnect between academic Estab-
lishment Clause inquiry and First Amendment values of religious freedom). The
context test avoids this problem by beginning with the facts known to the reasona-
ble observer and then discerning whether those facts comport with the broader
question of whether an establishment has occurred. See supra notes 156-67 and
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Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of the Texas capitol be-
cause the reasonable observer would not perceive, given the geocultural
context of the monument among other historical markers on the capitol
grounds, that the government was attempting to improperly establish re-
ligion when it accepted the monument from the Fraternal Order of Ea-
gles.' 74 In contrast, as the Court noted in McCreary, even though
observation of the counties' final display may have not raised the ire of the
reasonable observer, the observer nonetheless would have perceived an
improper governmental purpose behind the displays through knowledge
gained by the widespread public discussion and media coverage. 175
Admittedly, the context test does not dissolve all murkiness from the
Establishment Clause analysis; indeed, the Court has repeatedly admitted
that the subject inherently resists clarification. 176 Yet the benefit of the
context test is that it contains all analytical ambiguity within the bounda-
ries of the reasonable observer.177 Under the context test, the only area in
which courts must confront ambiguity is determining the scope of the rea-
sonable observer's experience.'1 7  This containment is desirable for two
reasons: first, it preempts the need to broadly define the limits of the pur-
accompanying text (describing geocultural context component of context test).
This is a shift from prior analysis, which attempted to define Establishment Clause
principles and then determine whether a factual scenario complied with those ide-
als. Compare Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (beginning with
academic ideals of Lemon test and subsequently evaluating facts of case against
them), with McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2734 (beginning analysis with perspective of
reasonable observer in order to evaluate ideals of government purpose), and Van
Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2861 (2005) (plurality opinion) (beginning Estab-
lishment Clause analysis with contextual considerations of national history rather
than abstract standards of purpose or effect).
174. See Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2864 (opining that Texas capitol grounds
represented state values in historical context and, therefore, Ten Commandments
monument did not run afoul of Establishment Clause).
175. See McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2740 ("No reasonable observer could swallow
the claim that the Counties had [in later displays] cast off the [religious] objective
so unmistakable in the earlier displays.").
176. See, e.g., Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 ("[W]e can only dimly perceive the lines
of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law.").
177. See, e.g., Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 550 (9th Cir. 2004) (acknowl-
edging that scope of information imputed to reasonable observer is unclear). Ad-
mittedly, the scope of the reasonable observer is not defined by a brightline test.
See Lisa M. Kahle, Comment, Making "Lemon-Aid" from the Supreme Court's Lemon:
Why Current Establishment Clause Jurisprudence Should Be Replaced by a Modified Coer-
cion Test, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 349, 367-68 (2005) (noting difficulty of defining
experience and knowledge of reasonable observer). Yet some ambiguity is inher-
ent in an Establishment Clause analysis; a reasonable observer test benefits the
inquiry by confining that ambiguity within a single analytical point. See Lemon, 403
U.S. at 612 (noting that lines in this sensitive area of law can only be "dimly
perceive [d]").
178. See Seidman, supra note 66, at 234-38 (describing judicial role in Estab-
lishment Clause evaluation based upon reasonable observer). Specifically, Seid-
man suggests that "[t]he task for judges is to identify vantage points, to learn how
to adopt contrasting vantage points, and to decide which vantage points to em-
brace in given circumstances." Id. at 236 (internal quotations omitted).
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pose, effect and entanglement criteria of the Lemon test.179 Second, con-
taining the analysis within the reasonable observer standard allows the
courts to focus their energies on one specific part of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, thereby allowing them to, over time, create a body of law
that delineates the experience of the reasonable observer, similar to the
judicial experience defining the scope of the reasonable person in tort
law.180 This essentially frees courts from having to explain broad abstract
components of a difficult test in favor of attempting to delineate the scope
of a single concept.1 8 1 The context test, with its focus on the perception
of the reasonable observer, would allow for the development of a more
consistent Establishment Clause jurisprudence in determining the consti-
tutionality of Ten Commandments displays. 182
VI. CONCLUSION
The context test's approach to Establishment Clause issues respects
the value of religious pluralism in modern American society while simulta-
neously allowing the government to acknowledge religious displays in con-
179. See id. at 23840 (observing that despite inherent difficulty of defining
scope of reasonable observer's experience, federal courts of appeals initially met
endorsement test with enthusiasm and had little difficulty applying it with consis-
tent results).
180. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779-80
(1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting that reasonable observer is similar
to reasonable person in tort law who is collective personification of community
ideals). But see Choper, supra note 69, at 510-31 (faulting endorsement test on
several grounds); Shari Seidman Diamond & Andrew Koppelman, Measured En-
dorsement, 60 MD. L. REv. 713, 724 (2001) (questioning whether reasonable ob-
server standard is capable of providing clarity to Establishment Clause
jurisprudence).
Among the weaknesses cited by Choper is the difficulty of defining the scope
of the reasonable observer, which he distinguishes from tort law's reasonable per-
son. See Choper, supra note 69, at 526 (distinguishing constitutional analysis under
Establishment Clause from tort inquiry of reasonableness). He argues that, to re-
cover for tortious emotional distress, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant
intentionally engaged in extreme or outrageous conduct. See id. at 526-27 (stating
premise of tort law). Under the endorsement test, however, the plaintiff must
prove only reasonable feelings of alienation resulting from government actions
that frequently lack not only an element of outrageousness, but that are under-
taken precisely because they represent the common values of a large segment of
society. See id. at 527 (distinguishing goals of constitutional analysis from those of
tort analysis).
181. Cf Greenawalt, supra note 172, at 361 (suggesting that "[w]hat courts
and lawyers should do . . . is focus on narrower principles relevant for particular
circumstances, drawing these principles partly from the very Supreme Court cases
decided under the Lemon test").
182. See Gershengorn, supra note 12 (observing that, in practice lower federal
courts have been able to consistently apply tests that involve context-intensive anal-
ysis). For a discussion of the scope of the context test, see supra notes 151-82 and
accompanying text.
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texts that represent the development of the American nation. 183
Admittedly, the context test, like other Establishment Clause tests, is not
perfect. 184 But in a world of complex and questioned religiosity, it may be
the best we can hope for.
18 5
Nathan P. Heller
183. See supra note 160 (arguing that context test is intended to reflect Ameri-
can values of religious freedom). For an interesting snapshot of the religious land-
scape in modern American society, see PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, PEW
RESEARCH CTR., AMERICANS STRUGGLE WITH RELIGION'S ROLE AT HOME AND ABROAD
49 (2002), available at http://pewforum.org/publications/reports/poll2002.pdf
(publishing statistics detailing American's views on religion, political issues and
correlation between them). The Pew Research Center study surveyed over two
thousand adults nationwide and found that in 2001 over eighty percent of individ-
uals identified their religious preference as "Christian." See id. (reporting survey's
findings). At least one percent of respondents also identified with Judaism, athe-
ism or agnosticism. See id. Ten percent expressed no religious preference. See id.
Though these numbers may seem to superficially indicate a trend toward homoge-
nous Christianity, data from the Gallup Poll collected in April 2005 indicates that
significant numbers of American Christians identify with at least nine different
denominations, including Roman Catholicism. See GALLUP ORG., GALLUP POLL,
RELIGION (2005), available at http://poll.gallup.com (follow "Poll Topics A to Z"
hyperlink; then follow "Religion" hyperlink) (site membership or trial subscription
required to access poll data) (detailing poll respondents who identified with vari-
ous Christian denominations).
184. See Greenawalt, supra note 172, at 359-61 (declaring that Lemon has
ceased to operate as unified test and describing various approaches that have
arisen to fill void left by its decline); see also supra notes 177, 180 (noting faults of
context test).
185. For a statistical and historical description of the modern American relig-
ious climate, see supra notes 3-6, 183. In addition to the above referenced exam-
ples, the past five years alone have seen several attempts to both bring religion
onto the public floor and wipe religion from it. See, e.g., Preer, supra note 4 (dis-
cussing recent challenges to religious displays). For example, Alabama Chief Jus-
tice Roy Moore roused the issue by clandestinely placing the Commandments in
the lobby of his courthouse in 2001. See Edward Walsh, Alabama's ChiefJustice Defies
Court Order; Moore Refuses to Remove Ten Commandments Monument from State Building,
WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 2003, at A02 (describing colorful history of Moore's actions).
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama issued an or-
der requiring removal of the two-and-one-half ton monument. See Glassroth v.
Moore, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1319 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (issuing order requiring re-
moval of monument), afjfd, 335 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003). Moore defied the
order, and was suspended from the bench. See Bill Rankin, 'Ten Commandments
Judge' Chief Justice Is Out in Alabama, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Nov. 14, 2003, at IA (re-
porting Moore's refusal to remove monument). The monument was removed on
August 27, 2003. See Alan Cooperman & Manuel Roig-Franzia, Debate Lingers as
Monument Is Removed from View; Commandments Display Put in Storage in Ala. Court-
house, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 2003, at A03 (recounting later removal of monument).
Several other states are also presently discussing Ten Commandments issues
or have recently done so. See Preer, supra note 4 (listing various Ten Command-
ments challenges around nation). In Indiana, several politicians have called for
the return of a Commandments monument on state capitol grounds despite a pre-
Van Orden court order requiring removal of the monolith. See id. (describing con-
troversy over monument in Indiana). Activists, headed by the Washington-based
Christian Defense Coalition, are undertaking a campaign in Boise, Idaho, to rein-
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state a Commandments monument in a public park and promise to do likewise in
other states. See Steven Kreytak, Capitol Religious Display May Stay; Ten Command-
ments Monument Has Historical Value, U.S. High Court Holds, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN
(Austin, Tex.), June 28, 2005, at Al (describing lobbying efforts in Idaho). Offi-
cials in Michigan have considered whether to institute a Commandments monu-
ment on their state grounds. See Preer, supra note 4 (describing Michigan
controversy). In Haskell County, Oklahoma, local officials have decided to allow
churches to place an eight-foot-high Ten Commandments monument on the
courthouse lawn. See David Zizzo, Battle Over Monument Could Become Burden for
Haskell County, DAILY OKLAOMAN, July 2, 2005, at 22A (reporting institution of
monument). And the city of Pleasant Grove, Utah, is fighting two Establishment
Clause challenges to a monument in a publicly owned park: one challenging the
constitutionality of the monument and another, filed by the minority religion of
Summan, seeking permission to display the group's Seven Aphorisms alongside
the display. See Angie Welling, 10 Commandments Up in Air in P1. Grove, DESERET
MORNING NEWS (Salt Lake City, Utah), Aug. 2, 2005 (reporting challenge to relig-
ious display in Utah).
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